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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article analyzes emerging trends in entrapment law, and is the
first to describe the declining numbers of reported cases that involve the
entrapment defense. This phenomenon is attributed to decreasing levels of
uncertainty in the rules pertaining to the defense and to discreet procedural
issues. The shifting degrees of certainty in penal rules, which have become
increasingly mechanical and mathematical overtime, are shown to disfavor
certain defendants inherently, to the point of being a snare or source of
"entrapment" themselves.
Most articles about entrapment discuss the competing legal tests used
to approach the problem, typically arguing in favor of one rule as opposed
to the other.' This Article focuses instead on how the entrapment defense
currently functions in our legal landscape, and highlights some important
emerging trends.
As the rules for entrapment become increasingly well-defined and
established, the defense itself becomes less relevant. The proportion of
cases where entrapment arises as a defense appears to be decreasing in
almost every state, as well as in the federal courts.2 In most states, the raw
number of reported cases has dropped off in recent years or has leveled off
in comparison with the mushrooming criminal dockets, meaning
entrapment cases are a diminishing proportion of the overall criminal
caseload. This is especially true of drug cases, which constitute the vast
majority of entrapment claims. Entrapment as a defense seems to have
peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s, correlating roughly to the
unprecedented explosion of drug-related cases, and has since fallen to a

1. See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 104 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that "the vast
majority of legal scholars regard the objective test favorably"); Gregory Deis, Note, Economics,
Causation, and the EntrapmentDefense, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (2001) (Deis himself

does not favor the objective test but acknowledges that he is in the minority in the academy); Roger
Park, The EntrapmentControversy,60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 167 (1976). When Park wrote in 1975,

he could only find one article from the previous twenty-five years criticizing the objective test, and
that article proposed abolishing the entrapment defense completely. See id. at 167 n.13 (citing
Michael De Feo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and
Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243 (1967)). Park, in the same footnote, remarks that there had been

over one hundred student notes from the same period that almost uniformly advocated for the
objective test. Id. My own research indicates that this continues to be a disproportionately popular
subject for student comments and case notes. Justice Stewart noted the clear tilt of the academy to
his side when he dissented in UnitedStates v. Russell. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445
n.3 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Model Penal Code Comment § 2.13, subs. (1) n.3
(listing influential early articles on the subject).
2. See infra Part III.A.
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fraction of the previous levels,3 even though drug convictions continue to
rise. It also is surprising that the defense most closely related to undercover
police work and sting operations would not keep pace with the growth of
its attendant police activity.
Across jurisdictions, this leveling-off of the defense appears to be
unrelated to the legal test used - there are two leading contenders, the socalled "objective" and "subjective" approaches. 4 The cases that do occur
seem disproportionately concentrated in certain jurisdictions, with some
using one test and some using the other. This waning of a particular
criminal defense is interesting not only for the study of the defense itself
but also for understanding the legal system overall. We normally study
defenses as element-based, formalistic concepts, rather than as a social
phenomenon that goes in or out of style.
A second emerging trend, previously overlooked in the relevant
literature, is the disproportionate number of entrapment cases that arise as
post-sentencing appeals.5 These are often couched as ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, or as challenges to a judge's refusal to give any
entrapment instructions to the jury. In either case, the defense really
functions as a "second bite at the apple," a last-resort defense used only
after others have failed. Framing entrapment in an "assistance of counsel"
appeal rarely works,6 due in part to the defendant's burden of showing that
his lawyer's shortcomings determined the outcome of the verdict.
Entrapment appeals based on jury instructions generally fare better since
the defendant's burden is functionally much lighter, but they are still far
from a safe bet for the defendant. The procedural posture of these cases
suggests that entrapment now functions less as a means of second-guessing
the aggressive activity of the police, which was the defense's genesis, and
more as a way of second-guessing attorneys and judges.
A third trend is the shift away from cases about the classic elements of
the defense, such as "inducement" or "predisposition," toward newer
variations such as "sentencing entrapment"7 (manipulation of sentencing
factors by savvy undercover agents) or "entrapment by estoppel" 8 (where
the defendant relied upon official assurances about the legality of the
activity charged as an offense). Both of these variations operate under
special rules and have yet to be accepted in most jurisdictions. While
conceptually related to traditional entrapment, they really function as
separate defenses. There is currently a split among the federal circuits as

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infraPart III and sources cited therein.
infraPart II (discussing history of the two tests).
infraPart III.D and sources cited therein.
infratext accompanying notes 75-89.
infraPart IV.A and sources cited therein.
infraPart IV.D and sources cited therein.
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to whether to recognize "sentencing entrapment," meaning the U.S.
Supreme Court is likely to address the issue at some point.9 Most of the
literature to date frames "sentencing entrapment" as a problem of
excessive investigative/prosecutorial discretion resulting from the adoption
of mechanical sentencing guidelines that are designed to limit judicial
discretion." This Article proposes that both "sentencing entrapment" and
"entrapment by estoppel" might be better understood as a function of
varying levels of uncertainty in legal rules and the effects of disparate ex
ante legal knowledge." Understood within this framework, the practice of

9. The Eleventh Circuit has rejected it entirely; the Seventh Circuit "disparages" it, but
several other circuits recognize it. See infra text accompanying notes 94-118.
10. See Robert S. Johnson, Note, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Search for a Cure: Using Sentence Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of
Sentencing, 49 VAND. L. REV. 197 (1996); Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The FederalSentencing
Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1993). For an excellent recent treatment of the subject of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including a concise survey of the history and summary of the
current state of appellate review, see Andrew D. Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right: Why
Courts of Appeals Should Review SentencingDeparturesDe Novo, 113 YALE L.J. 1955 (2004).
11. See generallyFRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, & PROFIT (1921). The Dictionaryof
Economics offers the following succinct explanation of "uncertainty" as opposed to risk:
(Uncertainty is] the state in which the number of possible outcomes exceeds the
number of actual outcomes and when no probabilities can be attached to each
possible outcome. It differs from risk, which is defined as having measurable
probabilities. Where probabilities are measurable, insurance can be taken out to
cover the worst contingencies - the risk of them occurring is spread among many
people or taken on by someone who can reasonably be certain to bear them. In the
case of uncertainty, however, no insurance company could properly assess what
premium to charge to cover bad outcomes - it is simply a possibility that has to be
faced. It is the role of the entrepreneur to face each uncertainty when setting up a
new company that justifies profit as a reward.
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 390 (Graham Bannock et al. eds., 7th ed. 2002); see also Marcello

Basili, KnightianUncertaintyin FinancialMarkets: An Assessment (demonstrating that uncertainty
in financial markets tends to generate inertia in investing decisions), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin? abstractid=237279 www.ssm.com (last visited Aug. 30,
2004); see also Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguityandthe SavageAxioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961).
Ellsberg demonstrated that individuals "act 'as though' the worst were somewhat more likely than
his best estimates of likelihood," which would "indicate he distorts his best estimates of likelihood,
in the direction of increased emphasis on the less favorable outcomes and to a degree depending
on his confidence in his best estimate."Id at 667. Ellsberg conducted famous experiments in which
subject faced two urns, M and N, which each contained one hundred red or black balls. Subjects
were informed that Urn M contained exactly half red and half black balls; the other contained an
unknown proportion of each. Bets were placed on the subject's ability to draw a black ball from
either urn; the subject showed a strong preference for Urn M, for which they knew the likelihood
of winning (fifty percent). This presented a contradiction to the classic rational-actor model of
economic thought because the subjects had no rational basis for such a consistent preference -
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setting defendants up for stiffer sentences during the sting operation may
not seem as nefarious as most commentators have asserted thus far. 2 The
increasingly rigid, mathematical nature of penal rules, whether gradated
levels of offenses or sentencing guidelines, do not confer discretion or
allow more room for abuse. Instead, they allow state agents to plan the
outcomes of their cases before an investigation even begins.
Not surprisingly, the last few years have also seen a spate of cases
concerning entrapment via the Internet, 3 particularly in on-line chat rooms
trawled by pedophiles. 4 Agents are able to exploit the anonymity of the
Internet to impersonate young adolescents willing to meet up with
strangers for a sexual rendezvous, which is where the defendant's arrest
occurs.' 5 These cases proceed under traditional rules for entrapment in the

uncertainty was just as likely to favor them, especially when compared to a fifty-fifty chance, as it
was to disfavor them. Id. at 650. This pattern of human decision-making has been verified in
innumerable subsequent experiments and came to be known as Ellsberg's Paradox. Uncertainty can
take the form of straightforward ambiguity - the individual knows the set of possible outcomes,
but cannot ascertain the relative likelihood of one as opposed to another. Alternatively, uncertainty
can take the form of the individual's recognition that there are unknown or hitherto unimagined
possible outcomes of a situation, an awareness of one's own ignorance. This latter type of
uncertainty would not apply to Ellsberg's experiment, of course, because the subjects knew that
they would either draw a black ball or a red one. There was no chance of drawing yellow or blue.
12. Other commentators have recently begun to apply the principles of uncertainty and risk
to criminal law, but this remains a new and fertile area for research and discussion. See, e.g., Alon
Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the
Neglected Role ofUncertainty in DeterringCrime, 1-2 AM. L. ECON. REv. 276 (1999) (discussing
how uncertainty in criminal sanctions serves as a better deterrent than increased sanctions or
enforcement); Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertaintyin Law: An ExperimentalApproach
(Feb. 14, 2003) (also describing the previously unappreciated value of orchestrated uncertainty in
law enforcement as an effective deterrent against crime), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
380302 (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
13. See infra Part V and sources cited therein.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2003); State v.
Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d 488, 489 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124, 127
(Ohio. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Neb. 2003); People v. Superior
Court, 2003 WL 21246774 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003); Marreel v. State, 841 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Kirwan v. State, 96
S.W.3d 724, 725 (Ark. 2003); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002);
People v. Martin, 2001 WL 1699653 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569,570 (Kan.
2001); United States v. Burgess, 175 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 1999); People v. Barrows,
N.Y.S.2d 672, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 9, 1998); see also infra Part V.
15. See generally Donald S. Yamagami, ProsecutingCyber-Pedophiles:How Can Intent be
Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the FantasyDefense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549
(2001) (arguing for legislative changes to facilitate greater law enforcement against on-line
pedophiles, specifically to deal with newfangled defenses that the on-line environment has
generated); William R. Graham, Jr., UncoveringandEliminatingChildPornographyRings on the
Internet:Issues RegardingandAvenues FacilitatingLawEnforcement'sAccess to "Wonderland,"
2000 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 457, 458 (2000).
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given jurisdiction and generally result in upheld convictions. The classic
entrapment rules do not account for the lack of face-to-face contact in
criminal activity conducted entirely through a computer nor how 6this
significantly changes the nature of both crimes and sting operations.'
While all these trends may at first glance appear unrelated, together
they form a realist's picture of the entrapment defense and its evolving
shape within our legal system. As a whole, the defense is in a state of
decline, as indicated by both the decreasing number of cases and the
procedural weakness in which they arise, usually after sentencing. Newer
areas such as sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel have not
produced a boon for questionably-convicted defendants but probably need
to be re-formulated to reduce the legal uncertainty that really drives these
niche cases. Newer cases introducing novelties such as Internet chat room
stings illustrate the obsolescence of the traditional rules because of their
cumbersome application to modem on-line communication.
Part II of this Article provides a very brief description of traditional
entrapment rules and the issues that have created perennial controversy.
Part III describes the decline of entrapment cases in recent years and offers
possible explanations for this phenomenon, as well as an assessment of its
significance for our legal system. This section also includes a discussion
of the weak procedural posture of many of these cases. Part IV discusses
sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel as a manifestation of
uncertainty about legal rules and proposes that these two areas may be
understood differently than most commentators have suggested. Part V
discusses on-line chat room sting operations and how they reflect on the
current state of entrapment rules. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.

16. See generally Jarrod S. Hanson, Entrapment In Cyberspace: A Renewed Call For
Reasonable Suspicion, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535 (1996) (arguing that entrapment no longer
provides adequate safeguards for civil liberties in cyberspace, and should have an added element
ofreasonable individualized suspicion prior to commencement of on-line sting operations); Jennifer
Gregg, CaughtIn The Web: EntrapmentIn Cyberspace, 19 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 157,170
(1996) (arguing that traditional entrapment rules provide inadequate safeguards against abuses by
law enforcement in the cyberspace arena). Both of these student comments take the position that
on-line law enforcement activities should be more circumscribed, somewhat contrary to the position
taken in this Article. The strength of these two pieces of scholarship is the way in which they
highlight the obsolescence of certain traditional rules and defenses pertaining to computer crime
and computer-based law enforcement. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Entrapment is a creature of American law, recognized nowhere else in
the world.17 It is entirely a function of undercover operations.' 8 Undercover

17. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapmentand the Problem of DeterringPolice Misconduct, 37
CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing the origins of the defense in this country and its
absence elsewhere). For a thoughtful comparative-law analysis of entrapment, contrasting the
approaches used in Europe with the United States, see generally Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in
UndercoverInvestigations:A ComparativePerspective,69 U. CUi. L. REv. 1501 (2002) (explaining
that in Europe the general rule is for the defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be
charged as accessories to the crime in situations that would be analogous to entrapment in the
United States). Ross discusses the fact that entrapment is a defense to criminal liability nowhere
outside the United States. She adds: "Most Western European legal systems instead treat
entrapment as a mode of complicity that fails to excuse targets but implicates the investigator in the
crime... European legal systems treat such conduct as criminal unless a law expressly exempts the
investigator from liability for specified acts." Id. at 1521-22; see Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan,
Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape? 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L. J. 317 (2003)
(comparing entrapment rules for the United States, England, Canada, and Australia, particularly
with regards to computer-crime decoys known as "honeypots"). Canada has taken an approach that
resembles this (but it is a more stark variation). In Queen v. Mack, the Supreme Court of Canada
defined its rule on entrapment in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a
Constitutional Act passed in 1982. Queen v. Mack, 2 S.C.R. 903 (1988). The Canadian high court
does not recognize entrapment as a defense to a crime, in the sense that the defendant can obtain
a complete acquittal; nonetheless, it empowered the judiciary to use its discretion in rejecting "the
spectacle of an accused's being convicted of an offense which was the work of the state." Id. at 81.
When a court finds, after the defendant is convicted,that the "authorities provide an opportunity
to persons to commit an offence [sic] without reasonable suspicion or acting malafides ... , " the
judge can issue a "stay ofproceedings," which puts the case on hold indefinitely without sentencing
the defendant at all. Id. at 119, 159.
The entrapment defense may have emerged in this country and not elsewhere because both
versions of the defense allow the courts to appropriate for themselves the power to supervise the
criminal justice system, even though that power of the judiciary is not clearly present in the U.S.
Constitution. For an argument along these lines, see Nancy Y.T. Hanewicz, Note, Jacobson v.
United States: The Entrapment Defense and JudicialSupervision of the CriminalJustice System,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 1163 (arguing that both tests for entrapment serve the same basic purpose of
giving the courts a self-appointed monitoring position over the police and sting operations). The
subjective test enables courts to achieve this supposed goal less explicitly - and therefore is less
likely to rankle the populace or the other branches of government - than the objective test. The
enhanced power of the courts through the entrapment defense comports overall with the greater
policy-making power of the judiciary in the United States than most other countries. Of course,
another explanation may lie in the fact that many other countries have not regulated vices like sex
crimes and addictive substances to the extent that the United States has, and thus have less need for
sting operations. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505, 572-73 (2001). Many countries also simply lack the resources for elaborate sting
operations.
18. See Stevenson, supra note 17:
Not all sting operations would constitute entrapment; but entrapment almost
definitionally involves sting operations. No discussion of entrapment could have
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operations are a function of a special type of criminal law, focusing on
"willing party" activities, such as sexual impropriety with minors, sales of
contraband and firearms, and bribery. 9 These consensual crimes naturally

much depth without touching on public policy about government stings. Sting
operations are but one method of law enforcement; police can also focus on
investigating crimes that have already been committed, or engage in more
monitoring and surveillance to catch would-be offenders in the nick of time.
See MARCUS, supranote 1, at 334 ("Simply stated, there is no defense of private entrapment when
the individual who induces the defendant is acting purely as a private citizen, not on behalf of the
government. This rule is accepted by virtually every court in the United States, with little
challenge."). Private entrapment may, however, constitute criminal solicitation, subjecting the
entrapper to criminal liability. See id. at 335 n.21. Government agents are generally immune from
this risk. For examples of failed attempts at raising "private entrapment" as a defense, see United
States v. Turner, No. C.R.A. 99-10098-RES, 2003 WL 22056405, at *2 n.3 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,
2003) (citing United States v. Emmert, 9 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1993) ("There is simply no
defense of private entrapment as Turner's hypothetical seems to suggest."); United States v.
Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Thus, there is no defense of private entrapment;
a defendant who was induced to commit a crime by a private party, without any government
involvement, cannot claim that he was entrapped."); State v. O'Neill, 967 P.2d 985, 990 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1998) (a reasonable amount of persuasion to overcome reluctance does not constitute
entrapment.); Emmert, 9 F.3d at 703 (defendant not entitled to entrapment because he failed to
show facts of improper government inducement); Prince v. State, 638 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (The district court held that entrapment was not an available defense when a
middleman, not a state agent, induced appellant to engage in a crime.); United States v. Marren, 890
F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court property refused to instruct the jury on entrapment
because the defendant failed to prove that he was not predisposed to commit the crime); United
States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Persuasion, seduction, or cajoling by
a private party does not qualify as entrapment even if the defendant was not predisposed to commit
the crime prior to such pressure."). A similar principle, of course, applies to evidentiary
exclusionary rules. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (Even "[t]he most
outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not
make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.").
19. For more discussion of the historical correlation between entrapment and these
transactional-type crimes, see DeFeo, supranote 1, at 250-51; MARCUS, supranote 1, at 12. For
a very thoughtful discussion of the prevalence of vice-related crimes in American law, and some
of the unintended consequences, see Stuntz, supranote 17, at 573. Stuntz notes the ironies inherent
in such legislated morality but also notes that such crimes do indeed create costly externalities that
concentrate in the neediest sectors of society.
Gambling, sex for hire, and intoxicants are all things that a large portion of the
public wants, and these goods and services are sufficiently cheap, at least in some
forms, that people of all social classes can afford them. At the same time, these
things generate both intense disapproval among another large slice of the
population, and substantial social costs that tend to concentrate in poor
communities. The result is complicated: anti-vice crusades tend to have strong
public support, but only so long as the crusades are targeted at a fairly small subset
of the population. Our tradition of giving police and prosecutors basically
unregulated enforcement discretion makes that targeting easy, which in turn
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go unreported and are notoriously difficult to detect without excessive
surveillance.20 Using stings and setups becomes the most feasible and
efficient way to catch lawbreakers under these circumstances."
Stings and setups, however, can ensnare almost anyone if taken far
enough. Consequently, American courts began to draw lines to separate
true criminals from those who appeared to simply be victims, regular
citizens dragged into activity they would never have done without police
inducement.22 These lines were drawn in two ways. The U.S. Supreme

permits legislatures to define criminal liability in ways that might otherwise be
politically impossible.
Id. at 573.
20. Justice Rehnquist observed this point with eloquence.
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but
a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for
illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct
frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses
law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of
detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful
present practices. Such infiltration is a recognized and permissible means of
investigation....
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 n.1 (1973).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300, 303 (D.D.C. 1964) ("It is
recognized, of course, that the use of informers and undercover agents to secure evidence in
narcotics cases is necessary to the efficient enforcement of the narcotics laws and has been
sanctioned by the courts."); Bernard W. Bell, SecretsandLies:News Media and Law Enforcement
Use of Deception as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. Prr. L. REv. 745, 747 (1999) ("Undercover
techniques provide an efficient and effective means to reveal secrets society needs to know - either
to sanction wrongdoers and frustrate their plans, or to warn potential victims."); Eric Blumenson
& Eva Nilsen, Policingfor Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REv.
35, 100 n.269 (1998) ("Complete control over the 'crime' makes 'sting operations' an efficient law
enforcement technique."). See generally Bruce Hay, Sting Operations,UndercoverAgents, and
Entrapment,(modeling economic efficiency for sting operations) available on the Social Science
Research Network (www.ssrn.com) (journal publication forthcoming).
22. The first federal court case to uphold an entrapment defense (at least with a published
decision) was Woo Wai v. United States, in which an immigration enforcement officer (in the
nascent days of immigration restrictions) had lured the defendant into a scheme for smuggling
Chinese illegal aliens into the country. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The
recruitment process had taken eighteen months. The circuit court focused on the lack of evidence
that the criminal intention had originated in the defendant's mind. Id. at 415. There are a few
English cases, starting in the late eighteenth century, that considered the defense, but English courts
never accepted it and the House of Lords officially disavowed it for the last time in the 1970s. Some
of the English cases did include dicta or dissenting opinions sharply criticizing the police for
overreaching, but they did not acquit the defendant. Also there are several American cases from the
nineteenth century, but the courts did not begin to recognize the defense until the early 1900s.
Perhaps the most frequently cited is Board of Commissioners v. Backus with its memorable but
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Court crafted a rule focused on defendants' "predisposition" to commit
crime.23 Because the rule was binding on all federal courts and influential
became the majority rule, commonly called
on many states, this approach
24
test."
"subjective
the
A dissenting and vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court, however,
insisted over the course of several decades that the rule focuses on the

disdainful commentary: "Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this
case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as the world,
and first interposed in Paradise: 'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat."' Bd. Comm'rs v. Backus,
29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1864). The first known state court to grant an acquittal based
on entrapment was the Texas Court of Appeals. O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 665 (1879); see
MARCUS, supranote 1, at 2-14; Andrew Ashworth, Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment,
2002 CRIM.L. REV. 161 (U.K. 2002) (discussing recent material from the House of Lords).
23. The U.S. Supreme Court cases are as follows (listed in chronological order for readers'
convenience): Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369,373 (1958) (holding that entrapment was established as a matter of law because petitioner was
induced to commit the crime); Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (the defendant's concession that there was
evidence to support the jury's finding that he was predisposed to commit the crime was fatal to his
claim of entrapment.); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (holding that the
defense of entrapment was unavailable to the defendant because he was predisposed to commit the
crime); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (denying the entrapment defense because
defendant failed to meet all of the elements); Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 554 (1992)
(reversing the defendant's conviction because the government failed to establish that defendant was
independently predisposed to commit the crime for which he was arrested). The first Supreme Court
case was Sorrels, where a federal agent posing as a tourist/fellow war veteran enticed his host, a
hospitable farmer, to sell him some liquor during the Prohibition years. The lower courts had denied
the availability of the entrapment defense; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that the defense
should be available, at least in a pretrial hearing. Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence arguing that
no trial should occur at all where the police instigated the offense, whereas the majority focused too
much on the defendant's predisposition. Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 435.
24. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 53 ("The overwhelming concern is with the 'otherwise
innocent' person, not with the nature of the government activity."); Park, supra note 1 (giving an
exhaustive survey of cases up to that date). Park takes the position of defending the approach used
in the federal courts, and he was one of the first two commentators to do so. Park attempted to
change the terminology from "subjective test" to "federal entrapment defense," because he felt that
the word "subjective" was confusing, given its different meanings in different areas of law. Id. at
166 n.4. His nomenclature did not catch on. However, to this day courts and commentators
universally use the original terms. The U.S. Supreme Court's position on entrapment takes on
special pragmatic importance for three reasons. First, the increasing federalization of criminal law
in the United States means that federal rules have an ever-greater relevance for law enforcement.
Second, the federal criminal code comprehensively covers many of the so-called "victimless
crimes" that lend themselves to enforcement via sting operations, and hence would naturally give
rise to more entrapment claims. Finally, entrapment remains a common-law defense in the federal
courts, meaning that the Court's jurisprudence on the issue completely carries the day. See also
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,517-19,525
(2001) (discussing the issue of federalization and willing-party (morality-based) crimes).
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police activities themselves.25 This would allow more rules to define which
tricks were acceptable and which were not. 26 The drafters of the Model
Penal Code (MPG) agreed, as it fit better with the more progressive agenda
of having juridical, and more mechanical, regulation of law enforcement.27
As states adopted portions of the MPC into their own statutes, several

25. The early cases had consistent dissenters favoring the other approach. See Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 435; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369; Russell, 411 U.S. at 423; see also Park, supra note 1, at
166.
Supreme Court Justices have been the oracles for both theories of entrapment. In
two leading cases decided in 1932 and 1958 - Sorrels v. United States and
Sherman v. United States - the Court endorsed the subjective defense. However,
articulate minorities, led by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter respectively, urged
a version that would focus solely on the issue of whether police conduct had fallen
below proper standards.
Id. The majority, however, has never wavered from the subjective test, and the more recent cases
indicate that the dissenters have given up or are no longer on the Court. See, e.g., Mathews, 485
U.S. at 66-67 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I have previously joined or written four opinions
dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's predisposition is relevant to the
entrapment defense... Therefore I bow to stare decisis, and todayjoin the judgment and reasoning
of the Court.").
26. See generally Hanewicz, supra note 17 (arguing that both tests for entrapment serve the
same basic purpose of giving the courts a self-appointed monitoring position over the police and
sting operations).
27. See Model Penal Code § 2.13 (1980); Model Penal Code § 2.11 cmts. 406-07,412 (1985)
(entrapment defense is an "attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the government .. "
"the primary justification for the defense ... is to discourage unsavory police tactics."). Robinson
& Darley identify the availability of the entrapment defense as one of several factors that undermine
the deterrent value of criminal laws generally. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does
CriminalLaw Deter? A BehavioralScience Investigation, 24 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
2004).The Model Penal Code's (MPC) position on entrapment has an interesting interplay with its
approach to conspiracies, especially in light of the fact that entrapment and conspiracy crimes are
interrelated. The MPC allows a conspiracy conviction even where the only other conspirator besides
the defendant was a government agent. See Model Penal Code § 5.03(1) (1980). This is usually
called the "unilateral approach" to conspiracy, which differs from the traditional (majority) rule
known as the "bilateral approach," which requires at least two real criminal (nongovemment agent)
members of a conspiracy before any member may be convicted of the charge. For a detailed
discussion of this plurality requirement, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRMINAL LAW § 6.5(g), 605-10
(3d ed. 2000). The MPC therefore makes it easier for the government to obtain convictions by using
sting operations - all one needs is a single victim (defendant) and one government agent - but
then imposes a rule for the entrapment defense that is less favorable to law enforcement, as it
focuses on the actions of the agents and not the defendant's predisposition. It is not clear if the
drafters intended this to be a balancing-out feature of the MPC, or if the odd combination was a
coincidence.
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included the MPC's "objective test" for entrapment.28 A few states, most
29
notably Florida, have attempted to use both approaches simultaneously.
Both approaches present problems. The subjective test's focus on the
predisposition of the individual defendant opens the door for evidence of
past crimes, which is prejudicial for many juries.3° Also, given that the
28. See Scott C. Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It: "A ProposedApproachto
Entrapment UnderJacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1002 n.45 (1994) (listing
thirteen, but the rules are constantly changing in the state courts and legislatures, with the courts
sometimes adopting a different rule than appears to be in the statute, making it difficult to get a
precise count). Alaska was the first jurisdiction to officially adopt the test in 1969, although it had
won the hearts of innumerable commentators and dissenters on courts before then. See Grossman
v. State,' 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969). For more explanation and criticism of the "objective
test," see Stevenson, supra note 17.
The objective test is so named because it purports to look at what a hypothetical
"average person" would have done if confronted with the same police come-on
used in the defendant's case. In this sense it resembles a "reasonable person"
standard from torts, albeit not exactly, because the "reasonableness" in torts is
more or less synonymous with "socially desirable," while no one would claim that
the defendant's commission of a crime, which has always occurred in an
entrapment case, would be "socially desirable" or something courts would want
to encourage. Courts using the objective test actually focus less on what the
imaginary average person would do than what the actual police did in the case
before them.
Id. The name "objective test" is sometimes used interchangeably with a defense called the
"outrageous government conduct test," but the latter refers to a constitutional due process violation
as opposed to a common-law affirmative defense. In the federal system, it appears to have been put
to rest by recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. For discussion, see Andrea B. Daloia, Note, Sexual
Misconduct and the Government: Time to Take a Stand, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 793, 794 (2000)
(arguing that such a test, although currently not used anywhere, should be mandated legislatively
for sexual enticement in sting operations); John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment
and Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 (1996) (suggesting
merging entrapment and outrageous government conduct into a single constitutional due process
test); Kenneth M. Lord, EntrapmentandDue Proess:Moving Towarda Dual System of Defenses,
25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 436 (1998).
29. Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico have variations on the
objective test that appear to be hybrids. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992); IND. CODE.
ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (West 1982); State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517, 520 (N.H. 1981) (holding that the
burden is on the defendant to prove the defense of entrapment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West
1982); Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043, 1045 (N.M. 1987) (holding that the defendant proved
entrapment as a defense because he was improperly induced to commit the crime); MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 182 ("A misreading of the objective test can cause inclusion of the predisposition
element."). A few commentators have proposed hybrid approaches, but the idea has not gained
widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Klar, The Needfor a Dual Approach to Entrapment,
59 WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 220 (1982); see generally supra note 17; Lord, supra note 28 (arguing for
both a hybrid entrapment defense to be available as well as a separate due process type defense).
30. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J., dissenting); LAFAVE, supranote 27, § 5.2(d).
Such evidence may often be admissible, to impeach the character of the defendant if she testifies
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defendant cannot deny having committed the crime itself, since stings
usually set up the defendant to be caught in the act, denying the disposition
to do it sounds contradictory to the jury."
The objective test purports to avoid these pitfalls,32 but instead allows
the awkward situation of acquitting some obviously dangerous criminals
simply because the judge feels squeamish about the undercover agent's
aggressive tactics.33 There also is doubt about whether the objective test is
an effective deterrant to police misconduct, given that police tend to

on her own behalf, and to impeach the reliability of other character witnesses for the defense. This,
in turn, can provide enforcement too much latitude in targeting people with previous convictions,
rather than looking for actual perpetrators of the latest unsolved crimes. Laurie Levenson notes a
similar phenomenon in the context of"three-strikes-you're-out" rules, claiming that defendants with
previous convictions will not risk life imprisonment and therefore plead guilty easily. When the
defendant enters a plea agreement instead of going to trial, there is no opportunity to raise the
exclusionary rules or claim that there were Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. Thus, Levenson
argues, police can afford to be much more cavalier about the exclusionary rules in cases where they
know the suspect has two previous convictions. See Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruptionand
New Modelsfor Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1,40-41 (2001).
31. Justice Stewart put it this way in his dissent in Russell: "The very fact that he has
committed an act that Congress has determined to be illegal demonstrates conclusively that he is
not innocent of the offense." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In addition, the term itself can be confusing for juries. See, e.g., Deis, supra note 1, at 1209 (stating
that "predisposition" is defined as "one who would have likely committed the same crime, without
government inducement, only in circumstances that would have made police detection more
difficult and more costly"); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1193, 1220 (1985) ("Police inducements that merely affect the timing and not the level of
criminal activity are socially productive; those that increase the crime level are not."). This begs the
question, of course. Does "likely to commit the crime" mean more than 50%? Or could it mean
likely enough to be "not remote"? It is an unanswered question how much "likelihood" is enough
to make the person dangerous enough to be a burden to society. Some critics contend that the
subjective approach seems to give law enforcement carte blanche to employ any form of trickery
or even coercion to get the defendant to commit a crime; no one can feel safe in such a society. See
LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 5.2(d), at 458 ("A second criticism of the subjective approach is that it
creates, in effect, an 'anything goes' rule for use against persons who can be shown by their prior
convictions or otherwise to have been predisposed to engage in criminal behavior.").
32. Paul Marcus put it nicely: "The greatest strength of the objective test may simply be that
it avoids the problems of the subjective test." MARCUS, supra note 1, at 104.
33. LaFave, supra note 27, § 5.2(e), at 459; MARCUS, supra note 1, at 108. Paul Marcus
observes that many object that the test is rather unworkable in its application, which seems to be
another way of saying the same thing: "The second major criticism of the objective test deals with
its practical application. Because the standard involves the hypothetical 'average person,' or
'reasonable person,' or 'normally law-abiding person,' it may be difficult to apply. The conceptual
difficulty is that such individuals generally do not commit crimes." MARCUS, supra note 1, at 106;
see also Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Alaska 1978) (complaining that the test is
unmanageable for the same reason). Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Mathews that "the
defense of entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on its merits," which
perhaps hints that he views the defense as mostly unnecessary. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S.
58, 67 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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measure their success in terms of the number of arrests they make rather
than the number of convictions to which they contribute.34 The fact that
arrestees may eventually be acquitted is a less urgent concern than catching
the perpetrator in the first place.
In addition, the objective test creates a type of legal certainty that is
more likely to favor the state than potential defendants. Jurisdictions using
the objective test, nearly a third of the states according to some authorities,
generate clear precedents about the lines undercover agents cannot cross.
The agents are more likely to have ex ante legal knowledge of these
specific parameters than the general population. The state actors therefore
are in a superior position to find loopholes in the rules, to plan around
them, and to make sure their tactics fall just shy of entrapment. This is true
in general; greater specificity in legal rules favors the parties that are more
established in society and have greater resources for obtaining legal

34. See Stevenson, supra note 17. There seems to be a growing consensus among
commentators that police maximize arrests, not convictions. For a review of the relevant literature,
see Stuntz, supra note 17, at 538 n.133.
Police differ from prosecutors in (at least) two critical ways. Their focus is on a
different stage of criminal proceedings. With some qualifications, prosecutors
maximize convictions; police are more likely to maximize arrests. And they are
more culturally distinct from the rest of the population than are prosecutors, so
that departmental culture is a more powerful force in police conduct than it is in
prosecutorial behavior.
Id. at 538; see also Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the ExclusionaryRule, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1999) ("But the sociological literature strongly suggests that the
primary goal of officers in the field in the average case is to get a 'collar.' If they do, they've done
their job. It is the prosecutor's job to convict."). Roger Park notes that police sometimes find
enough satisfaction in harassing or inconveniencing suspects with arrests that the final outcome of
the case is not critical to them. Park, supra note 1, at 232. There is more ongoing controversy,
however, over the question of whether prosecutors also have motivations other than maximizing
convictions. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Old Chiefv. United States: StipulatingAway Prosecutorial
Accountability? 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 981-89 (1997) (suggesting that besides political and public
relations concerns, some prosecutors' offices believe it is much more valuable to prosecute serious
or dangerous criminals than first-time or petty offenders, even though the latter would often be
easier cases to win); but see Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is not Whether You Win or Lose, it is
How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss ScorekeepingMentality DoingJustice ForProsecutors?
38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001) (arguing, mostly anecdotally, that prosecutors are obsessed with
winning); Thomas A. Hagemann, Confessions From a Scorekeeper: A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151, 152-53 (1996) (arguing that winning is very important to many
prosecutors, but that this is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the pursuit of justice); Scott
Baker Claudio Mezzetti, ProsecutorialResources, Plea Bargaining,and the Decision To Go To
Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149, 150-51 (2001) (presenting conventional model that prosecutors
maximize convictions subject to cost restraints); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39, 70 (1993)
("Today's goal is simply to maximize convictions. This need to convict has driven prosecutors to
rely on the plea bargain as a quick and easy way to maximize the number of convictions.").
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counsel beforehand.35 Thus, even though the objective test on the surface
seems to be more pro-defendant since it scrutinizes the police rather than
the accused - the ultimate effect may be to make the state's sting
operations almost invincible and the defendant's conviction more certain
as a result of the greater certainty in the rules.
The nature of the entrapment defense also creates some problems with
accumulating reliable data. Defendants who assert the defense successfully
are acquitted or have charges dismissed, and there is usually no written
decision issued in such a case that would appear in published reports. The
written opinions, especially the appellate opinions, usually reflect only the
cases where the entrapment defense failed. It is therefore difficult to
determine exactly how often the defense is raised or how often it succeeds,
although the reported cases do provide helpful clues. The conventional
wisdom is that it is rarely raised and that it rarely succeeds,3 6 but this

35. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Sanctions,70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing generally that uncertainty
overdeters and underdeters the wrong people respectively); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence,
UninformedIndividuals, andAcquiringInformation about WhetherActs are Subject to Sanctions,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990); Michael F. Ferguson & Stephen R. Peters, But I Know It When I
See It: An Economic Analysis of Vague Rules (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that vague rules
have more deterrent value and are often more efficient), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.
taf'?abstractid=218968 (last visited Aug. 31, 2004); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, J. LEGAL STuD. 257 (1974) (arguing that vagueness-related
uncertainty in legal sanctions is inefficient). I have maintained elsewhere, however, that overdeterrence is of limited concern in criminal law because most crimes do not border on socially
desirable behaviors. Many of the activities that come "close" to the line of illegality would present
no social loss in being avoided; in addition, the under-deterrent effect would be weaker than any
over-deterrent effect, given that aversion to uncertainty outweighs aversion to risk. See generally
Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrenceand UncertainLegal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986) ("Our analysis shows that if the uncertainty
created by the legal system is distributed normally about the optimal level of compliance, and if the
uncertainty is not too large - two seemingly plausible assumptions - then the result under normal
damage rules will be too much deterrence rather than too little."); Ehrlich & Posner, supra at 263
("Those costs [of overdeterrence through uncertainty] must be compared with the costs in reduced
prevention of socially undesirable activity as a result of loopholes that must arise when the
legislature reformulates the statutory prohibition in more specific terms."); Ferguson & Peters,
supra at 7 ("More complex rules provide a greater advantage to those skilled in creating
loopholes.").
36. See, e.g., Carrie Casey & Lisa Marino, Federal Criminal Conspiracy,40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 577, 599 (2003) ("The entrapment defense is also only rarely successful."); Raphael Prober
& Jill Randall, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 571, 593 (2002) ("The
entrapment defense is also rarely successful."); Beth Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal
Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 777, 803 (2001); Bruce A. Green, There but for
Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional "Case Studies " in Legal Ethics, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 977, 985
(2000); Keri C. McGrath & Jennifer L. Pfeiffer, FederalCriminal Conspiracy, 36 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 661, 681 (1999); John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and Objective Entrapment:
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assertion seldom comes supported by empirical data or even survey
evidence.
III. CONCENTRATION AND DECLINE

A. Introduction
Entrapment cases are disproportionately concentrated in a few states.37
They are declining almost everywhere, even including these concentration
points. Many factors can account for this, but both of these phenomena
seem to be largely dependent on levels ofuncertainty and knowledge of the
relevant legal rules.
The data supporting these conclusions is more survey-oriented than
scientific or statistical. True scientific mapping of the entrapment defense,
if possible in spite of the limitations already mentioned, could be the
subject of future research. Even though the nature of written judicial
opinions restricts a survey to cases where criminal defenses failed, we can
draw some useful inferences from the numbers such a survey provides.
The numbers indicate that in both the federal and state systems,
entrapment cases are on the decline.38 This is particularly striking

TowardA Culpability-CenteredApproach,43 UCLA L. REV. 209,213 (1996) (citing Park, supra
note 1, at 272). LaFave also mentions this problem in his section on the procedural aspects of the
defense, noting that it is perceived to be a minefield for defendants wherein their character is put
at issue. Some consider it a defense of last resort. See LAFAVE, supranote 27, § 5.2 (f), at 460.
37. California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington are
among the states with far more entrapment cases than other states with large populations and
significant crime rates.
38. For example, a search in the "ALLFEDS" database of Westlaw reveals only nineteen
federal entrapment cases for the first half of 2004. This does not include sentencing entrapment and
entrapment by estoppel, which are really distinct defenses. About forty-four each year were found
for 2003 and 2002, but seventy-two for 2001, whereas the numbers in the early 1990s were in the
hundreds. See United States v. Kennedy, 372 F.3d 686, 688 (4th Cir. 2004) (unsuccessful appeal
of failed "perjury entrapment" defense); United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004)
(defense failed); United States v. Chavez, No. 03-1482, 2004 WL 1157780, at *1 (10th Cir. May
25, 2004) (jury rejects defendant's entrapment defense); United States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426,
2004 WL 1147091, at * 1 (2d Cir. May 21, 2004) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); United States
v. Ferby, Nos. 02-1506, 02-1535, 2004 WL 1147087, at *3 (2d Cir. May 19, 2004) (upholding trial
court's refusal to give entrapment instruction to jury); United States v. Anderson, No. 02-4255,
2004 WL 857442, at *1 (3d Cir Apr. 22, 2004) (ineffective assistance appeal for failing to raise
entrapment defense); United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 2004) (defendant not
entitled to entrapment instruction); United States v. Vega, Nos. 02-50253, 02-50499, 2004 WL
785311, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2004) (jury rejects entrapment defense); Cunigan v. Hurley, No.
03-3284, 2004 WL 540446, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2004) (ineffective assistance for failing to
request entrapment instruction at trial, conviction affirmed); United States v. Valenzuela, No. 022216, 2004 WL 376852, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (insufficient evidence of lack of
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predisposition); United States v. Gallardo, No. 03-30124, 2004 WL 300423, at *1 (9th Cir 2004)
(attempt to withdraw guilty plea in order to raise entrapment defense post-sentencing); United
States v. Glaum, 356 F.3d 169, 177-78 (1st Cir. 2004) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); United
States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 776-78 (7th Cir. 2004) (entrapment defense abandoned in middle of
proceedings); Ozoroski v. Klem, No. CIV.A.04-561, 2004 WL 1446046, at *4 (E.D. Pa., June 28,
2004) (unsuccessful ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, where one witness was brought to
support entrapment defense); United States v. McGee, No. 03C4618, 2004 WL 1125893, at *1
(N.D. Ill., May 19, 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failure to raise defense);
United States v. Al Selami, No. 04CR20, 2004 WL 1146116, at *5 (N.D. Ill., May 18, 2004)
(unsuccessful entrapment defense); Padgett v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 2d 593,607-08 (D. S.C.
2004) (entrapment rejected); United States v. Alvarez, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2004);
Barnes v. Dretke, No. 4:03-CV-0816-4,2004 WL 323941 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 26,2004) (unsuccessful
entrapment defense at trial). The forty-four federal entrapment cases for 2003 illustrate the general
failure of the defense: United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (defendant not
entitled to jury instructions on multiple conspiracies or entrapment defense); United States v.
Howard, No. 02-21355, 2003 WL 22849815, at * 1 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2003) (defendant not entitled
to entrapment jury instruction); United States v. Franklin, No. 02-2299, 2003 WL 22854571, at *2
(10th Cir. Nov. 28, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); United States v. Capelton, 350
F.3d 231, 243 (1 st Cir. 2003) (evidence supported findings that defendant voluntarily sold drugs
to undercover officer, defeating entrapment defense); United States v. Persinger, No. 02-1477,2003
WL 22905307, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2003) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); United States v.
Lewis, 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (entrapment unsuccessful at trial); United States v. Carrillo,
No. 02-106916, 2003 WL 22682509 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2003); United States v. Vlanich, Nos. 012264, 01-2315, 2003 WL 22213951 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2003) (refusal to allow entrapment defense
as matter of law); United States v. Edwards, No. 02-3068, 2003 WL 22239582, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 21, 2003) (admitting "other crimes" as evidence is necessary to determine defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime); United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 2003)
(affirming jury's rejection of defendant's entrapment defense, given his eagerness to commit the
crimes); United States v. Tignor, No. 03-4140, 2003 WL 22113628, at * 1 (4th Cir. Sept. 12, 2003)
(entrapmentjury instruction refused); United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (jury
rejects defense); United States v. Medina, Nos. 00-2267, 01-1974, 2003 WL 22016375, at *4 (1 st
Cir. Aug. 27, 2003) (defendants not entitled to entrapment instructions); United States v.
Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) (not entitled to entrapment instructions where
defendant's burden of proof not met); United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 987-88 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (defendants prohibited from withdrawing guilty plea in order to raise entrapment); United
States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (sting operation did not induce defendant's
criminal activity so as to warrant entrapment instruction); United States v. Tafoya, No. 00-50660,
2003 WL 21949167 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2003); United States v. Jahner, No. 02-10536, 2003 WL
21920011, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (unsuccessful entrapment defense); United States v. Shults, Nos.
01-6532, 01-6533, 01-6534, 2003 WL 21500006, at *9 (6th Cir. June 26, 2003) (entrapment
defense waived by guilty plea, cannot be withdrawn); United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 959
(9th Cir. 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment evidence to jury);
United States v. Pedraza, No. 02-2313, 2003 WL 21246583 (10th Cir. May 30, 2003); United
States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's refusal to give an
entrapment instruction to jury in money laundering case); United States v. Broadwater, No. 022426, 2003 WL 21265185, at *4 (7th Cir. May 30, 2003) (unsuccessful entrapment defense);
United States v. Brooks, No. 01-10282,2003 WL 21147412 (9th Cir. May 15,2003) (Defendant's
entrapment defense failed because there was no showing that defendant was induced to commit the
crime by illegal acts of the government agents.); United States v. Curtis, 328 F.3d 141 (4th Cir.
2003) (defendant unsuccessfully claimed a psychological condition made him abnormally
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because the number of criminal cases, especially drug cases, increase over
time with the population and with the ongoing advances of the War on
Drugs.3 9 There is no reason to think, for instance, that undercover or sting

susceptible to entrapment); United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324, 2003 WL 1090706, at *1 (3d
Cir. Mar. 12, 2003) (deciding not to downward departure for sentence entrapment); United States
v. Thomas, No. 024128, 2003 WL 593384 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (holding that the entrapment
defense inapplicable); Urias v. Lucero, No. 01-2352, 2003 WL 359448, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 19,
2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present an entrapment defense); United States
v. Morin, No. 02-30109, 2003 WL 344344, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2003) (quoting United States
v. Marquardt, 949 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[A]ffirming refusal to apply downward
adjustment where defendant indicated that he had not intended to violate the law and that the
authorities 'steered' him toward child pornography"); United States v. Fuentes, No. 02-2143, 2003
WL 191442, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2003) ("[A]ssertion of the entrapment defense coupled with
acknowledgment of the underlying criminal activity automatically entitles a defendant to a twopoint acceptance of responsibility reduction."); United States v. Schake, No. 02-1743, 2003 WL
202439, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2003) (the circuit court affirms the district court's holding that
defendant had failed to show how trial counsel's arguably deficient performance prejudiced
defendant's trial to the extent that it undermined confidence in the trial's outcome); United States
v. Salazar, No. 02-2018,2003 WL 165940, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 24,2003) (refusing to give the jury
a definition of "inducement" did not significantly affect the jury verdict); United States v. Coger,
No. 02-4568, 2003 WL 149848, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003) (ruling that the defendant did not
meet the burden of showing that the district court erred in denying him the use of the entrapment
defense); Towles v. Dretke, No. CIV.A.403CV0822Y, 2003 WL 22952820, at *6 (N.D. Tex., Dec
10, 2003) (ineffective assistance appeal contending that had counsel talked to potential defense
witnesses regarding his entrapment defense prior to trial, counsel would have known the witnesses
were not going to testify favorably); Unsell v. Dretke, No. CIV.A.4:03-CV-254-A, 2003 WL
22328904, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2003) (jury unconvinced by attempted entrapment defense);
United States v. Waddy, No. CRIM 00-66-1, Civ. 92-6827, 2003 WL 22429047, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 18, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failing to raise defense); Montag v.
United States, No. CRIM. 0079(I)(JRT/FLN, Civ. 02-4723(JRT), 2003 WL 22075759 (D. Minn.
Aug. 5, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failing to raise defense); United States
v. Turner, No. CR.A.99-10098-RGS, 2003 WL 22056405, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2003)
("vicarious entrapment" defense unsuccessful); McMillen v. United States, 2003 WL 21751707
(N.D. Tex. July 28, 2003) (defense regarded as frivolous in this case); United States v. Duncan, CR.
3:02CR122(CFD), 2003 WL 21305469, at *1 (D. Conn. June 4, 2003) (jury rejects entrapment
defense); United States v. Nguyen, No. CR 99-4068-MWB, 2003 WL 1785884, at *1 (N.D. Iowa
Apr. 3, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Davis, Nos. 99-40091-JAR, 023174-JAR, 2003 WL 1463263, at * 1 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2003) (unsuccessful entrapment defense at
trial); Miles v. Jackson, No. 02-CV-72789-DT, 2003 WL 1119930 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2003).
39. There is evidence that interpersonal crime (murder, assault, rape, etc.) and larceny
decreased noticeably in the 1990s, and there are competing explanations for this phenomenon
(changes in gun laws, economic conditions, etc.). For a thought-provoking survey of the various
explanations, see StevenD. Levitt, UnderstandingWhy CrimeFell in the 1990's:FourFactorsthat
Explain the Decline andSix That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 163-64 (2004). Levitt does not
discuss the types of crimes that are typically the subject of sting operations, however; it is difficult
to find data on these crimes in particular. The numbers of reported cases on Westlaw continue to
grow, of course. Another recent publication by Levitt, reviewing the work of others, discusses the
War on Drugs and notes that the number of those incarcerated on drug charges grew from 30,000
nationwide in 1980 to 400,000 by 1996, the period during which entrapment cases peaked and then
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operations themselves are decreasing. For example, a Westlaw search
comparing drug-related entrapment cases with the overall number of drug
related cases in a given year shows that the ratio of reported entrapment
cases to the larger body of cases for the same substantive offense has
dropped to single digits (usually five or less) in almost every state. The
same ratio was well into the double-digits almost everywhere
approximately fifteen years ago. These are not precise figures or even
categories, of course, but the trends are remarkable. Westlaw searches are
not perfect - they turn up many false positives - but one would expect
similar numbers of false positives for the same search conducted for
different years (but perhaps not across jurisdictions). Yet almost every
jurisdiction saw a spike in the ratio of entrapment cases around 1988, and
a smaller surge in the early 1990s, and then a steady decline since then to
numbers half the size of the peaks figures, or even less.

began to decline. Steven D. Levitt, Review of Drug War Heresies by MacCoun and Reuter, 41 J.
ECON. LrrERATURE 540, 541 (2003). Levitt offers a way to reconcile the increases in drug
convictions and decreases in violent crimes.
[V]iolent and property crime are 1-3 percent lower as a result of the incarceration
of drug offenders. This result may seem counterintuitive since increased drug
prisoners have crowded out punishments for other offenders. Empirically,
however, incarcerating a drug criminal yields almost as large a reduction in violent
and property crime as locking up someone convicted of those crimes. As a
consequence, the net effect of increasing drug punishment is to reduce other
crimes.
Id. at 544.
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Given that the written decisions reflect mostly losing defenses,4" one
explanation for the decline might be that more defendants are winning

40. See supra text accompanying note 38 and cases cited therein for the most recent two
years; the 2002 cases are similarly uniformly dismal from a defendant's perspective and are few
enough to be cited in their entirety: Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial
court's refusal to give entrapment instruction merited reversal); United States v. Valle-Leanos, Mo.
01-10752, 2002 WL 31779833, at * 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2002) (entrapment completely unsupported
by evidence); United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2002) (failed motion for directed
verdict on entrapment defense); United States v. Hines, No. 01-5011, 2002 WL 31496420, at *1
(4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2002) (entrapment instruction refused); United States v. Fridley, No. 01-5553,
2002 WL 1808448, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2002) (refusal to give entrapment jury instruction);
United States v. Bums, 298 F.3d 523, 528-39, (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court's denial of
entrapment defense in drug case); United States v. Corona, No. 01-10487,2002 WL 1417555, (9th
Cir. July 1, 2002) (reversing and granting a new trial based on district court's refusal to provide
undercover informant's statements to defendant for preparation of entrapment defense); United
States v. Scott, No. 01-7124,2002 WL 1150819, at *2 (10th Cir. May 30,2002) (failed entrapment
defense); United States v. Mannar, No. 01-4379,2002 WL 1020705, at *1 (4th Cir. May 21, 2002)
(jury disbelieved entrapment defense); United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (11th Cir.
2002) (government informant's favorable terms for sale of narcotics did not entitle defendant to
submission of entrapment defense); United States v. Arnold, No. 01-10251,2002 WL 598056, at
*1 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2002) (holding that the factual findings support the court's decision not to
reduce sentencing because of entrapment); United States v. Pedroni, No. 99.5182, 2002 WL
993573, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 18,2002) (defense failed); United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 17374 (2d Cir. 2002) (defense failed); Aros. v. Stewart, No. 01-15795, 2002 WL 530536, at *1-2 (9th
Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); United States v. Coleman, 284
F.3d 892, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2002) (jury disbelieved entrapment defense); United States v. Johnson,
No. 0 1-4553, 2002 WL 431936, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2002) (jury rejects entrapment defense);
United States v. Tierney, No. 01-1018, 2002 WL 461750, at * 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19,2002) (elements
of entrapment not met); United States v. Kurkowski, 281 F.3d 699, 701-02 (8th Cir. 2002)
(entrapment rejected as a matter of law); United States v. Thomas, Nos. 00-5426, 00-5831, 2002
WL 89670, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2002) (failed entrapment claim); United States v. Khalil, 279
F.3d 358, 364-65 (6th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessful); Slusher v. Furlong, No. 01-1192, 2002 WL
12252, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal failed); United States
v. James, No. 02CR278, 2002 WL 31749174at *3 (N.D. I11.Dec. 3, 2002) (pretrial rejection of
entrapment defense); Tocco v. Senkowski, No. 0OCiv.5508(JSM), 2002 WL 31465803, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov, 04, 2002) (refusal to give entrapment jury instruction upheld); United States v.
DeWoody, 226 F. Supp. 2d 956, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (claim that destruction of evidence by
government fatally undermined entrapment defense rejected as harmless error); Lombardo v. United
States, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (failed entrapment defense); United States v.
Hospedales, 247 F. Supp. 2d 530, 541 (D. Vt. 2002) (failed entrapment defense); United States v.
Adamidov, No. CVO 1-72-BR, 2002 WL 31971836, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 4, 2002) (defense failed);
United States v. Gambini, No. CIV.A.99-225, 2002 WL 1767418, at *1 (E.D. La. July 30, 2002)
(unsuccessful); Causey v. Bock, No. 99-CV- 10309-BC, 2002 WL 1461766, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July
2, 2002) (failed entrapment defense); Sims v. Cockrell, No. CIV.A.301CV1007M, 2002 WL
1315797, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2002) (failure of counsel to investigate evidence to support
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entrapment claims. This might seem to explain the drop in entrapmentrelated appeals. This explanation, however, is inadequate for several
reasons.
First, the available opinions, although representing cases where the
defense failed at trial, or failed to arise procedurally, describe in vivid
detail the facts and circumstances under which entrapment defenses lose.
These fact summaries can leave the reader wondering if any defendant
could ever win under such strict rules since many of the failed entrapment
claims seem plausible. Entrapment is an affirmative defense, meaning the
defendant bears the burden of offering some evidence of entrapment before
the prosecution must respond as part of proving the state's case. The level
of proof required of the defendant varies somewhat from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but is lower than a burden of proof. Courts regularly find
insufficient evidence of entrapment where the stipulated facts reflect a
complex, heavy-handed sting operation. In other words, the available cases
leave no reason to believe that other defendants easily prevail with the
entrapment defense.
Second, if a decline were due to more defendants winning, one would
expect this, in turn, to be explained by some sudden shift in the rules to
favor defendants. This has not occurred. The rules of entrapment in almost
all jurisdictions have been the same since the early 1980s.
Third, even if the rules had become more lenient or the courts had
found some other mechanism to accomplish the same thing, a rise in
acquittal rates from the entrapment defense would presumably increase its
popularity with more marginal defendants, especially given the existence
of a defined set of local defense attorneys. An easy acquittal technique
would be adopted by everyone, even those with marginal claims to the
defense. This would reduce the number of plea agreements and increase
the number of defendants losing at trial, at least for a short time period. In
fact, one might expect the number of losing cases to rise along with the
numbers of wins, until the real boundaries became clear. This observation
also could apply in reverse: a spike in the number of entrapment appeals,
even though they were loser defenses, could reflect more unreported
acquittals for the same period.
For these reasons, it is reasonable to glean some tentative, general
conclusions from the reported entrapment cases, even if they provide only
a partial picture. The partial picture we have indicates that entrapment is
on the decline as a defense everywhere. In addition, the cases tend to be
concentrated in a few states: California,4 Florida,42 Michigan,43 Ohio,'

possible entrapment defense); Pettav. Cain, No. CIV.A.01-3891, 2002 WL 1216619, at * 11 (E.D.
La. June 3, 2002) (jury disbelieved entrapment defense); United States v. Brunshtein, No.
98CR769TPG, 2002 WL 987275, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2002) (defendant not entitled to new
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trial to present entrapment defense); United States v. Barragan-Rangel, 198 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); United States v. Richardson, No.
CRIM.A.0 1-235, 2002 WL 461662, at * 1 (E.D. La. Mar. 21,2002) (evidentiary contest unrelated
to contemplated entrapment defense);United States v. Merlino, 204 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D. Mass.
2002) (rejection of attempted "entrapment as matter of law" defense); Perkins v. United States, No.
CIV.A.300CV2042M, 2002 WL 368523, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6,2002) (unsuccessful entrapment
defense); United States v. Perez, No. 3:97-CR-342M, 2002 WL 442231, at *4-6 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
5, 2002) (unsuccessful entrapment defense at trial); Decker v. Cockrell, No. 7:98-CV-085-R, 2002
WL 180888, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); United
States v. Grass, No. CRIM.A-00-120-01, 2002 WL 59364, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2002) (failed
entrapment defense); United States v. Richardson, No. CRIM.A.01-235, 2002 WL 59412, at *3
(E.D. La. Jan. 14, 2002) (evidentiary ruling jeopardizing entrapment defense); United States v.
Hall, 56 M.J. 432,437 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (military entrapment case; defense unsuccessful); see also
Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542,545 (6th Cir. 2001) (habeas petition contesting plea agreement,
discusses failed entrapment defense in state court proceedings); United States v. Nunez, No. 003188, 2001 WL 277832, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 22, 2001) (affirming rejection of defendant's
entrapment claims); United States v. Martinez-Villegas, No. 98-50056, 2001 WL 219893, at *2
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001) (defense disproved sufficiently by prosecution); United States v. Terry, 240
F.3d 65, 70 (1 st Cir. 2001) (appellant blamed unsuccessful entrapment defense on jury instructions,
conviction affirmed); United States v. Barriga, 246 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding trial
court's rejection of entrapment defense); United States v. Pinque, 234 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir.
2000) (defendant not entitled to entrapment instruction); United States v. Boyd, 248 F.3d 1160 (7th
Cir. 2000) (unsuccessful entrapment defense at trial); United States v. Cox, 242 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.
2000) (defendant's entrapment defense unsuccessful because government proved he had the
predisposition to sell cocaine); but see Barbee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-2228 GBRE, 2002
WL 1784318, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 16, 2002) (defendants acquitted on entrapment defense);
United States v. Garcia, No. 00-10062, 2001 WL 30043, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2001) (trial court's
refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
41. See, e.g., People v. Reyes, No. B167375, 2004 WL 1354298, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June
17,2004); People v. Reiner, No. B 150375,2004 WL 1171507, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 26,2004),
Reh'g denied, June 14, 2004 (defense unsuccessful in extortion case); People v. Smith, No.
H02562B, 2004 WL 1120878, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20, 2004); People v. Estrada, No.
B166217, 2004 WL 765958 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2004); People v. Hale, No. C042472, 2004
WL 602641, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2004); People v. Dang, No. A102449, 2004 WL
370791, at *1 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2004); People v. Johnson, No. E033632, 2004 WL
194035, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2,2004); People v. Tinoco, No. B161983, 2004 WL 156873, at
*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28,2004); People v. Hernandez, No. H024632, 2003 WL 23101085, at *9
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003); People v. Washington, No. B164430, 2003 WL 22966235, at *3
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2003); People v. Huerta, No. A097743, 2003 WL 22839284, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003); People v. Buckmaster, No. C041801, 2003 WL 22520497, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2003); People v. Pigage, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2003);
People v. Nicolas, No. A099174,2003 WL 21738954, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 28,2003); People
v. Jefferson, No. B158725, 2003 WL 2008282, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 2, 2003); People v.
Bristow, No. F039418, 2003 WL 257372, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7,2003); People v. Adair, 62
P.3d 45, 53 (Cal. 2003).
42. See, e.g., State v. Blanco, No. 4D03-113, 2004 WL 86646, at *2-*4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Jan. 21, 2004) (the celebrated "hottie defense" case); Perez v. State, 856 So. 2d 1074, 1077 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that evidence of prior convictions showed defendant's predisposition
to commit the crime); Concepcion v. State, 857 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2003)
(holding that jury instructions and the use of the word "or" constituted reversible error); Worley
v. State, 848 So. 2d 491,492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Marreel v. State, 841 So. 2d 600,603 (Fla.
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Tennessee, Texas,45 and Washington 46 are states with the highest numbers
of entrapment cases. The large criminal dockets of these states helps

Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that the entrapment defense is denied because law enforcement agents
induced the defendant).
43. See, e.g., People v. Mills, No. 245226, 2004 WL 787145, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 13,
2004) (ineffective assistance appeal); People v. Anderson, No. 241769, 2004 WL 103189, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); People v. Leonard, No.
236871, 2003 WL 22681789, at *2-*4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003); People v. Micheau, No.
241036, 2003 WL 22358874, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2003); People v. Hunter, No. 236888,
2003 WL 22112435, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003)(ineffective assistance of counsel
appeal).
44. See, e.g., State v. Klapka, No. 2003-L-044, 2004 WL 1238411, at *4-*5 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 04, 2004) (trial court refusal to give entrapment instruction); State v. Burgins, No. 03JE34,
2004 WL 1240373, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 2004) (failed entrapment defense); State v.
Bolden, No. 19943, 2004 WL 1043317, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7, 2004); State v. Scurles, No.
WO-03-041, 2004 WL 937276, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2004); State v. Cunningham, 808
N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (Internet chat room case); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124,
133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Chong Hadaway, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm'n, No. 03AF-414,
2004 WL 232147, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2004) (a rare administrative enforcemententrapment case, defense unsuccessful); City of Dayton v. Clark, No. 19672, 2004 WL 67945, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004); State v. Carter, No. 02CA028, 2004 WL 35458, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 5,2004); State v. Ellison, No. L-02-1292,2003 WL 22946188, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
12, 2003); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876, 880-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the
defendant's entrapment defense); State v. Mahan, No. CA2002-10-262, 2003 WL 22326562, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2003); State v. Charlton, No. 02CA008048, 2003 WL 21185794, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 2003); State v. Graves, No. L-02-1053, 2003 WL 21040652, at *4 (Ohio
App. May 9,2003); State v. Matthews, No. OT-02-020, 2003 WL 1699926, at *2-*3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 31, 2003); State v. Edwards, No. L-00- 1161, 2003 WL 257383, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7,
2003); State v. West, No. 2002CA38, 2003 WL 139976, at *1-'2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2003).
45. Entrapment failed in everyone of the following cases: Busby v. State, No. 01-02-00554CR, 2003 WL 22999526, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 18,2003); Warfield v. State, No. 12-03-00032CR, 2003 WL 22480405, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2003); Sullivan v. State, No. 05-02-00313CR, 2003 WL 22456326, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 30,2003); Garza v. State, No. 06-02-00163-CR,
2003 WL 22232836, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003); Jang v. State, No. 05-02-01343-CR,
2003 WL 22020788, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2003); Fautner v. State, No. 05-01-01297-CR,
2003 WL 21783349, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2003); Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 587
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Gonzalez v. State, No. 2-02-291-CR, 2003 WL 21101520, at *2 (Tex. Ct.
App. May 15, 2003); O'Dell v. State, No. 11-02-00085-CR, 2003 WL 21047576, at *7 (Tex. Ct.
App. May 8,2003); Faughn v. State, No. 14-02-00431-CR, 2003 WL 1987855, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App.
May 1, 2003); Dow v. State, No. 03-02-00515-CR, 2003 WL 1922435, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr.
24,2003); Chowdhuryv. State, No. 14-02-00176-CR, 2003 WL 1738414, at * 1(Tex. Ct. App. Apr.
3, 2003); Garcia v. State, No. 14-02-00408-CR, 2003 WL 748858, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 6,2003).
46. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, No. 51112-2-I, 2004 WL 880382, at *6-*7 (Wash. Ct. App.
Apr. 26,2004); State v. Woodman, No. 29949-6-Il, 2004 WL 729198, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr.
6, 2004); State v. Rivera, No. 51684-1-I, 2004 WL 188306, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2004);
State v. Wright, No. 21285-8-111, 2003 WL 22970974, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2003); State
v. Finnie, No. 21317-0-Ill, 2003 WL 22753621, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003); State v.
Gisvold, No. 49357-4-I, 2003 WL 21267822, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 02, 2003); State v.
Whipple, No. 49711 -l-I, 2003 WL 1963239, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2003).
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explain the larger number of cases for a certain criminal defense, but states
such as New York,4 7 Pennsylvania,48 New Jersey,49 and Illinois" are
surprisingly absent from the list. These latter states have large populations
and large criminal dockets, but their numbers of reported entrapment cases
are less than five or ten per year.
There are, therefore, two parallel phenomena operating in tandem: the
concentration of entrapment cases in certain places, and the overall decline
in every jurisdiction. Both merit discussion.
B. Concentrationand Uncertainty
One might expect that the difference in legal rules betweenjurisdictions
would explain the concentration of cases in certain areas. Such a view
would have an inherent appeal to those who believe in the rule of law as
the causal factor for legal outcomes. The appeal is heightened, naturally,
where there are two rival rules at play: the subjective and objective
approach.
Regardless of the relative merits of the rules, they do not appear to
affect the relative number of entrapment cases that arise. Pennsylvania, for
example, uses the objective test, but has had only five reported entrapment
cases in the last three years" and only three in the three years before that.52
New York uses the subjective test, and its number of entrapment cases for

47. See infra text accompanying note 53.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
49. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 841 A.2d 505, 510-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(rejecting the defendant's entrapment defense); State v. Williams, 834 A.2d 433, 436 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that the confidential informant aided law enforcement in a drug bust
by pointing out the defendant); State v. Williams, 813 A.2d 1215, 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2003) (holding that the identity of the informant was not necessary for this case).
50. See, e.g., People v. Glenn, 804 N.E.2d 661, 666 (I11.App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting the
defendant's entrapment defense); People v. Rose, 794 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (111.App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that the defendant's entrapment defense did not warrant releasing the informant's identity);
People v. Mendez, 784 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel).
51. Commonwealth v. Joseph, 848 A.2d 934,939 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (Internet chat room
case); Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (Internet chat room
case); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Commonwealth v. Lebo,
795 A.2d 987,993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (child pornography case); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 829
A.2d 1194, 1202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (remanding for re-sentencing due to issues dealing with how
close the drugs were to a school zone).
52. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406 (Pa. Aug. 19, 1999) (claiming ineffective
assistance ofcounsel); Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633,638 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (allowing
past offenses into court to show the likelihood that defendant was involved with the transaction);
Commonwealth v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225, 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (rejecting the defendant's
entrapment defense).
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the last three years was little more than Pennsylvania's;53 but the numbers
are still paltry for a state with such an active and interesting criminal
docket. Ohio54 and Texas,"5 in contrast, each had over twenty-five
entrapment cases in the last three years. Their numbers are close, yet Ohio
uses the subjective test and Texas the objective test. Numerous; other
comparisons could be made to illustrate the same phenomenon: the test
used by courts in a given jurisdiction is not very predictive of how many
entrapment cases will arise. Therefore, the effect of the rules on more
causal factors such as the activities of police or the acquittal rates for
defendants is also in doubt.
The concentration of entrapment cases in certain jurisdictions is more
likely to result from a combination of three factors other than the rule of
law. These are: undercover or sting operations being favored by local law
enforcement chiefs, peer influence among the local defense bar, and a state
of uncertainty about the legal rules in a given jurisdiction. It seems that the
first two factors are largely dependent on the third but not vice-versa,
making the third the most important variable.
There is no question that undercover operations are unevenly
distributed across the United States. Certain law enforcement agencies
embark on undercover or sting operations as part of a discreet project
targeting a particular crime. Ohio, for example, recently deployed
enforcement officers to pose as decoys in Internet chat rooms to catch
pedophiles, 6 imitating a job often done by federal agents. This led to

53. By comparison, covering the exact same time period as the preceding footnotes, see
People v. Moultrie, 773 N.Y.S.2d 287, 287-88 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (denying the defendant's
request to charge the affirmative defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that
defendant was improperly induced to commit the crime); People v. Coleman, 773 N.Y.S.2d 146,
148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that the entrapment defense was neither raised nor preserved);
People v. Delaney, 765 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's
entrapment defense because there was no evidence that the officer actively persuaded the defendant
to engage in the transaction); People v. Otto, No. 2002-924DCR, 2003 WL 21974317, at *2 (N.Y.
Supp. App. Term July 3, 2003) (administrative entrapment case); People v. Arias, 756 N.Y.S.2d
487 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); People v. Missrie, 751 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (granting
a new trial because of erroneous jury instructions on entrapment); People v. Castro, 750 N.Y.S.2d
510,511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (rejecting the defendant's entrapment defense because he was
predisposed to commit the offense); People v. Chou, 738 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(rejecting the defendant's entrapment defense); People v. Alicea, 734 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (deciding no to the defendant's entrapment defense on appeal); People v. Rojas, 760
N.E.2d 1265, 1269 n.5 (N.Y. 2001); People v. Gilbert, 722 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
54. See supra text accompanying note 44.
55. See supra text accompanying note 45.
56. See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876, 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (upholding Ohio
State Statute as not constituting entrapment); State v. Moller, No. 2001-CA-99, 2002 WL 628634,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002) ("The Xenia Police Department created the Xenia Computer
Crime Unit in 2000 to capture Internet criminals.").
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several Internet-entrapment cases in Ohio that are not typical for most
states. Such projects depend on available resources and local political
pressure to respond to crime waves. Undercover activities also may react
to legal rules, although police are generally more focused on making
arrests than obtaining convictions. Bright-line rules are conducive to
planning operations ahead of time and make it easier to work around the
rules or find loopholes.57 For instance, if police know that certain types of
sting operations are expressly rejected by local courts, the police can
simply resort to alternative schemes to sidestep the rules. Clarity and
specificity in legal rules create legal loopholes.58 Those with ex ante legal
knowledge and time to plan ahead are in the best position to take
advantage of these loopholes in the rules. In other words, legal certainty
favors entities that are established, endowed with resources, and able to
obtain legal counsel. Few entities fit this profile better than the state itself,
including its enforcement arm.5 9 Legal certainty disfavors small or lessenfranchised parties, such as individual defendants, who are unaware of
the stronger party's strategy which is designed around the rules. Weaker
parties also have less recourse or redress when the case is in court because
the inflexibility of bright-line rules determines the outcome.6" This is not
to say bright-line rules are wrong; they are efficient to the extent that they
yield predictable, consistent results. However, predictable results are most
beneficial to those with the advance knowledge of the rules. Legal
foresight is not evenly distributed.
Conversely, small parties or individual defendants are sometimes
favored by uncertainty in the law, which allows for windfall benefits in
individual cases that would otherwise be unavailable. This is the legal
equivalent of "profits," as Frank Knight uses the term.6 ' Thus, one would
expect to find more undercover or sting operations in jurisdictions with
clear, specific rules about entrapment, just as ex ante sentencing
manipulation by agents occurs in the presence of mechanical sentencing
guidelines.
The opportunities for entrapment cases depend on the number of
undercover operations conducted at the margins of legality. Entrapment
cases are necessarily a subset of the number of sting operations. Factors
that encourage more sting operations, like bright-line rules about what
tactics are permissible, will also be factors that can increase the number of
entrapment cases in that area. At the same time, as more entrapment cases

57. See, e.g., Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally KNIGHT, supranote 11; Ellsberg, supra note 11 (explaining "uncertainties
that are not risks").
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challenge various undercover tactics lines will be drawn more clearly,
making subsequent attempts at pleading entrapment futile because the
outcome will be predictable.
Peer influences among criminal defense lawyers also affect the
proliferation of certain defenses or trial strategies. If a few defendants
succeed with the entrapment defense, this will quickly become known to
other attorneys working in that courthouse, who will consider adopting it
for their own clients. This, too, is dependent on uncertainty in the legal
rules. Uncertain outcomes will encourage defendants and their attorneys
to take their chances at trial, but this becomes futile as the outcomes
become a sure thing. Plea agreements replace trials as certainty increases.62
Thus, uncertainty is the most important variable determining where
entrapment cases will concentrate.
C. Decline and Uncertainty
The overall rise and fall of the entrapment cases over the last twenty
years also relates to the varying levels of uncertainty in the legal rules.6 3
The first real spike in the entrapment cases occurred in almost every state
in the three years between 1988 and 1991, followed by a second large
spike in the three years between 1992 and 1995. There was a significant
drop-off after 1995, and a continuing decline to the present. Current levels
have returned to their pre-1998 state.
The temporary surge in entrapment cases in the late eighties and early
nineties was due to two contemporaneous and related events: the War on
Drugs and a pair of entrapment decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
War on Drugs generated far more undercover operations than ever before,
not only for narcotics but also for related crimes, such as firearm offenses
and money laundering. These ensnaring tactics were new to many defense
attorneys and defendants alike. It would have been easy to see a possible
entrapment claim in every case. The defense had been relatively rare prior
to this time, but so were undercover operations, at least compared to the

62. Obviously bright-line rules are more efficient for moving cases on thejudicial docket and
generally lowering transaction costs for all the parties. Criminal defendants, however, do not always
benefit from an efficient, predictable prosecutorial system as much as they do from a system
allowing for some unpredictable results.
63. The reported cases from earlier decades, such as the 1960s and 1970s, reveal rare
instances of the entrapment defense, which could be explained in terms of predating the War on
Drugs (which made undercover operations much more commonplace) and the modem Supreme
Court cases on the subject. The problem with drawing any sort of conclusions from these early
periods is that older cases are less likely to be available on Westlaw and Lexis - especially
unpublished opinions.
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present time.' So, it is unsurprising that many of those caught in the new
abundance of sting operations would try the defense created to address this
very form of law enforcement, even though it must have been only vaguely
familiar to many of those using it. As the courts addressed the cases and
the rules and outcomes became more predictable, the defense would have
become less useful. Prosecutors would not bother to take cases to trial
where it was clear that the defendant had a strong entrapment case, and
defendants with weaker arguments would tend to enter plea bargains. Legal
uncertainty, however, is likely to last for only a certain number of cases.
A 1988 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, Mathews v. UnitedStates,65
also seemed to spur the increase in entrapment cases everywhere. The
defendant in Mathews was an employee of the Small Business
Administration and was caught accepting a bribe as part of a sting
operation. 666 He was denied a jury instruction on entrapment because he
refused to admit to certain elements of the charged offense.67 The Court
held that defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to jury instructions
regarding entrapment whenever there is sufficient evidence to indicate the
possibility of entrapment. 6' The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
entrapment is naturally very influential even in states using other tests.69
Even though this case was not an obvious expansion of the entrapment

64. The first Supreme Court cases from the Prohibition Era contain similar comments that
the defense, unknown at common law, was turning up everywhere as undercover operations to
enforce prohibition and Comstock laws were becoming more widespread. There is no available data
to draw a comparison to the present time, but one may surmise that the present era has far surpassed
any earlier periods in this regard.
65. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
66. Id. at 60.
67. Id. at 61.
68. Id. at 62.
69. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision generated a small flurry of law review articles and
case notes in the next two or three years. See, e.g., George Robert Hicks, III, Note, The 'No I
Didn 't, And Yes I Did But . . .' Defense: Is the Entrapment Defense Available to Criminal
Defendants Who Deny Doing the Crime? -Mathews v. United States, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 279,
308-09 (1989) (urging state court adoption of Mathews rule); Jerry Schreibstein, Note, Entrapment
in Light ofMathews v. United States: The Propertyof Inconsistency and the Needfor Objectivity,
24 U.S.F. L. REV. 541, 569 (1990) (arguing in support of Mathews holding); Laura Gardner
Webster, BuildingA Better Mousetrap:ReconstructingFederalEntrapmentTheory From Sorrells
To Mathews, 32 ARiz. L. REV. 605, 629 (1990) (criticizing the Mathews Court for not taking the
opportunity to adopt the objective test instead of the subjective test for entrapment generally); Lana
Wender, Comment, Mathews v. United States: Simultaneous Denial of Crime and Claim of
Entrapment- ShouldInconsistency Preclude Availabilityof the EntrapmentDefense? 23 GA. L.
REV. 257, 274 (1988) (supporting the Mathews holding as a victory for justice and fairness);
Kristine K. Keller, Note, Evolution andApplication of the EntrapmentDefense: Abandonment of
the Inconsistency Rule, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 362 (1988) (arguing in favor of allowing
defendants to plead inconsistent defenses simultaneously).
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defense, its subtle tinkering created uncertainty about how to apply the
rules to various fact patterns, allowing more fodder for litigation.
The second of the pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases from this period
was the 1992 caseJacobsonv. UnitedStates,7 ° in which the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the defendant in a child-pornography case. The
government agents in this case had spent two years sending increasingly
provocative pornography, until the defendant finally succumbed to the
pressure to order some explicitly illegal material, which prompted his
arrest."1 The case led to a flurry of speculation in academic journals about
the rules being relaxed72 since the defendant won.

70. 3 U.S. 540 (1992).
71. See generally id.
72. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Presenting,Back from the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment
Defense, 47 U. FLA. L. REv. 205, 229-30 (1995) (arguing that entrapment will always have the
inducement of the defendant by the government element, as well as the lack of predisposition to
commit the crime by the defendant element); Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive
Foundationof the Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1151 (1995); Scott C. Paton, "The
Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United
States, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 995, 998-1005 (1994) (discussing the subjective and objective
approaches to the entrapment defense); Amy Perkins, Comment, Jacobson v. United States EntrapmentRedefined?, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 847 (1994) (discussing a defendant's predisposition);
Aubry Matt Pesnell, Note, The EntrapmentDefense: A Cry for Decisiveness, Consistency, and
Resolution, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 163 (1993); Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny For The Serpent:
The Court Refines EntrapmentLaw in Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 1027, 103847 (1993) (discussing the objective approach and the predisposition element); J. Patrick Sullivan,
Note, The Evolution of the FederalLaw of Entrapment:A Needfor a New Approach Jacobson v.
United States, 58 Mo. L. REv. 403 (1993); Leslie G. Bleifuss, Note, Entrapmentand Jacobson v.
United States: "Doesn't The GovernmentRealize that They can Destroy a Man's Life?, " 13 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 431 (1993); Damon D. Camp, Out of the QuagmireAfter Jacobson v. United States:
Towards a More BalancedEntrapment Standard,83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1063-74
(1993) (discussing the subjective and objective approaches to the entrapment defense); Elena Luisa
Garella, Note, Reshaping the FederalEntrapmentDefense: Jacobson v. United States 68 WASH.
L. REV. 185, 197 (1993) (stating that "a defendant asserting entrapment cannot complain of an
appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition."); Michael 0. Zabriskie,
Comment, If the PostmanAlways "Stings" Twice, Who is the Next Target?- An Examination of
the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 217 (1993); Erich Weyand, Comment Entrapment:
From Sorrells To Jacobson - The Development Continues 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 293 (1993)
(showing some criticism of the entrapment defense); Jack B. Harrison, Note, The Government as
Pornographer:Government Sting Operationsand Entrapment:United States v. Jacobson, 61 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1067 (1993) (discussing the question that is at the heart of every discussion of the
entrapment defense: "Can the government encourage persons to violate the law by creating the
mechanism which makes such a violation possible and then prosecute the person for that
violation?"); Hanewicz, supra note 17, at 1163 ("explores the interaction between the Supreme
Court's approach to entrapment and its stand on the issue of judicial supervisory power by
analyzing the Jacobson opinion"); Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells To Jacobson: Reflections
on Six Decades ofEntrapmentLaw, and RelatedDefenses, in FederalCourt,27 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 829 (1992); Lance B. Levy, Comment, The "Sting" ofGovernment Operations:An Analysis
of Predispositionas it Relates to the EntrapmentDefense - Jacobson v. United States, 26 SUFFOLK
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Jacobsonalso generated a spate of new attempts to use the entrapment
defense by hopeful parties. The rules were uncertain. As the first few
rounds of new cases were litigated, however, it became clear that any
change in the entrapment rules would be applicable to only a narrow set of
circumstances or facts and the furor subsided. In fact, by raising the
uncertainty temporarily, the U.S. Supreme Court's somewhat confusing
ruling probably contributed to an eventual decline in the number of
entrapment cases. The temporary uncertainty would have spawned new
attempts at entrapment claims, and the new surplus of cases would have
provided opportunities for more judicial holdings on more fact patterns,
regarding various subtleties of the rules. Once the new batch of cases was
resolved, the rules would be clearer than ever. This would have made
entrapment claims in the trial context more and more unfruitful. However,
the Jacobsonruling was narrow enough to result in uncertainty for only a
short time.73 It did not require a wholesale reassessment of the defense.
It should be noted that simply creating a definitive rule does not result
in legal certainty. For example, several legislatures have codified their test
for entrapment, 74 perhaps to pre-empt the courts from choosing a test for
themselves. Changed rules cause a surge in related cases until the courts
have time to apply the new rules to various sets of facts. Once a number of
fact patterns have been adjudicated, the certainty effect sets in, and the
cases that are tried or appealed diminish.

U. L. REV. 1177 (1992) (discussing a child pornography case where the court found that the
defendant did not have the predisposition to commit the offense); see alsoCynthia Perez, Casenote,
United States v. Jacobson: Are Child Pornography Stings Creative Law Enforcement or
Entrapment?,46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235 (1991).
73. The main uncertainty resulting from Jacobson was whether the government would
thereafter have to show some individualized reasonable suspicion of the defendant before
commencing the "inducement" phase of a sting. No courts subsequently adopted this approach,
however, and the issue has subsided.
74. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-3-31 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (Michie 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-206
(2004);,ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (2002); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-15 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 432 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 777.201 (2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-237 (Michie 2002); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/7-12 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Michie 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213210 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.010 (Michie 2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.066 (2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-213 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:2-12 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.275 (2002);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-505 (2004); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.06 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A. 16.070
(2004).
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The procedural posture of a defense can be another signal of decline.
In the context of entrapment, procedural posture reaches the level of
paradox. Entrapment is an affirmative defense, which means the defendant
does not deny the allegations but rather asserts some extenuating
circumstances that should cancel out any culpability." Affirmative
defenses76 are supposed to appear early in the drama of the criminal trial;
many states require that defendants notify the judge and prosecution of a
contemplated affirmative defense, including an entrapment defense before
a trial is set,77 often so that the court can weigh the claim in a preliminary

75. Delaware's entrapment statute sums this up particularly well: "The defense of entrapment
as defined by this Criminal Code concedes the commission of the act charged but claims that it
should not be punished because of the wrongdoing of the officer .. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
432 (2004). For a thoughtful discussion ofaffirmative defenses, see generally Leslie YalofGarfield,
Back to the Future:Does Apprendi Bar a Legislature's Power to Shift the Burden of ProofAway
from the Prosecutionby Labeling an Element of a TraditionalCrime as an Affirmative Defense?,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1351 (2003) (discussing recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the issue); B.
Patrick Costello, Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: "Who Decides What Constitutes A
Crime? "An Analysis of Whether a Legislatureis ConstitutionallyFree to "Allocate'"an Element
ofan Offense to an AffirmativeDefense or a SentencingFactorWithoutJudicialReview,77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1205 (2002).
76. Generally speaking, unless a defense goes to the merits of the prosecutor's allegations,
affirmative defenses involve shifting the burdens of proof in a criminal case from the prosecution
to the defendant, usually temporarily and to a lesser degree, and then back to the prosecutor.
Regarding entrapment, "The courts have split as to which parts of the entrapment defense must be
proved by whom. In addition, questions are raised as to the standards of proof and the allocation
of burdens." MARCUS, supranote 1, at 216. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has not defined
the burden of proof issue precisely for the subjective test used in federal courts. Id. Most
jurisdictions require the defendant to make a prima facie case for entrapment - most use a
"preponderance of evidence" burden of proof at this point - before the burden shifts back to the
prosecutor to disprove the allegations or to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. Id. at 216-23. The prosecutor carries the normal burden of proof on this point. Id. at 226.
States using the objective test almost always place the burden on the defendant to show that the
police activity was outrageous. Id. at 227-28.
77. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-323 (2) (2004).
Within 30 days after the arraignment or at a later time as the court may for good
cause permit, the defendant shall provide the prosecutor with a written notice of
the defendant's intention to introduce evidence at trial of good character or the
defenses of alibi, compulsion, entrapment, justifiable use of force, or mistaken
identity.
Id.; see State v. Dezeeuw, 992 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1999); People v. Day, 665 N.E.2d 867, 870
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ("He gave the state notice of his intent to use the entrapment defense at trial.");
see also N.M. CRIM. P. § 5-508; FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE § 3.200. Such pretrial notice does not
necessarily bind the state or the defense to bring the defense up at trial, depending on the
jurisdiction. See State v. Davis, 512 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Or. Ct. App. 1973). The pretrial notice rule
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hearing.7" In some states, especially those using the objective test, a
decision in the defendant's favor at this stage results in a complete
dismissal of the charges79 rather than an acquittal.8 0 Even in states where
entrapment is a question for the jury to decide after trial, which is the
majority rule, the entrapment defense is intended to arise early in the case.
Yet that is not how the cases always play out. In fact, a surprising
number of the cases -possibly one-third to half of all entrapment claims
in recent years - occur in the context of post-trial, post-sentencing
appeals. Some of these appeals are complaints against the trial judge for
refusing to let the jury consider an entrapment defense.8' More interesting

has been challenged, sometimes successfully. See, e.g., State v. Lane, N. 14-01-34, 2002 WL
1299771 (Ohio Ct. App. May 30, 2002) (successful challenge to such a rule by defendant).
78. See, e.g., United States v. James, No. 02CR278, 2002 WL 31749174, at *6 (N.D. I11.Dec.
3, 2002) (pretrial rejection of entrapment defense).
79. See., e.g., Hemandez v. State, No. 03-03-00285-CR, 2004 WL 1403706, at *6 (Tex. Ct.
App. June 24, 2004) (defendant successful where "The proper remedy when the State fails to
disprove the entrapment defense at a pretrial hearing is dismissal of the prosecution with
prejudice."); Taylor v. State, 886 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that the
defense was successful because the pretrial determination was in the nature of an acquittal and did
not impact the charging instrument); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(defendant unsuccessful at obtaining dismissal); West v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-001876MR, 2004 WL 68524, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004).
80. A dismissal of criminal charges can be beneficial to the defendant in that it eliminates the
legal costs of going through a trial (which is required to obtain an acquittal), and can avoid trial
evidence and testimony that would generally tarnish the defendant's reputation. On the other hand,
dismissal does not trigger double jeopardy protections, meaning the defendant could face revamped
charges relating to the same events if the prosecutor wishes to try again.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Ferby, Nos. 02-1506, 02-1535, 2004 WL 1147087, at *3 (2d
Cir. May 19, 2004) (upholding trial court's refusal to give entrapment instruction to jury); United
States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (defendant not entitled to jury instructions on
multiple conspiracies or entrapment defense); United States v. Vlanich, Nos. 01-2264, 01-2315,
2003 WL 22213951, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2003) (refusal to allow entrapment defense as matter
of law); United States v. Medina, No. 00-267, 2003 WL 22016375, at *4 (1st Cir. Aug. 27, 2003)
(defendants not entitled to entrapment instructions); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 1718 (1 st Cir. 2003) (not entitled to entrapment instructions where defendant's burden of proof not
met); United States v. Pedraza, No. 02-2313, 2003 WL 21246583 (10th Cir. May 3, 2003); United
States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's refusal to give an
entrapment instruction to jury in money laundering case); United States v. Hines, No. 01-5011,
2002 WL 31496420, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2002) (entrapment instruction refused); United
States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1345 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (government informant's favorable terms for
sale of narcotics did not entitle defendant to submission of entrapment defense); United States v.
Kurkowski, 281 F.3d 699, 701 (8th Cir. 2002) (entrapment rejected as a matter of law); Tocco v.
Senkowski, No. 00 Civ. 5508(JSM), 2002 WL 31465803, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 04, 2002) (refusal
to give entrapment jury instruction upheld); United States v. Barriga, No. 99-10549, 2000 WL
1844271, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2000) (upholding trial court's rejection of entrapment defense);
United States v. Pinque, 234 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2000) (defendant not entitled to entrapment
instruction); Barr v. State, 79 P.3d 795 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003); but see United States v. Gurolla, 333
F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment
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is the large number of cases couched as appeals for ineffective assistance
of counsel, where the defense attorney did not raise the defense earlier.82
Either the trial attorneys encouraged defendants to accept a plea agreement,
which they regret once they receive their sentence,83 or an alternative trial

evidence to jury); United States v. Garcia, No. 00-10062, 2001 WL 30043, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 5,
2001) (trial court's refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error; case reversed and
remanded).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, No. 02-4255, 2004 WL 857442, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr.
22,2004) (ineffective assistance appeal for failing to raise entrapment defense); Cunigan v. Hurley,
No. 03-3284, 2004 WL 540446, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2004) (ineffective assistance for failing
to request entrapment instruction at trial, conviction affirmed); United States v. McGee, No.
03C4618, 2004 WL 1125893, at *2 (N.D. I11.May 19, 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel
appeal for failure to raise defense); Urias v. Lucero, No. 01-2352, 2003 WL 359448, at *1 (10th
Cir. Feb. 19, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present an entrapment defense);
United States v. Coger, No. 02-4568, 2003 WL 149848, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003); Towles v.
Dretke, No. CIV.A.403CV0822Y, 2003 WL 22952820, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2003)
(ineffective assistance appeal contending that had counsel talked to potential defense witnesses
regarding his entrapment defense prior to trial, counsel would have known the witnesses were not
going to testify favorably); United States v. Waddy, No. CRIM. 00-66-1, Civ. 92-6827, 2003 WL
22429047, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failing to
raise defense); Montag v. United States, No. CRIM. 0079(1)(JRT/FLN, Civ. 02-4723(JRT)), 2003
WL 22075759, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 05, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal for failing
to raise defense); United States v. Nguyen, No. CR99-4068-MWB, 2003 WL 1785884, at *4 (N.D.
Iowa Apr. 3, 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Aros. v. Stewart, No. 01-15796, 2002 WL
530536, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, failed); Slusher v.
Furlong, No. 01-1198, 2002 WL 12252, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2002) (ineffective assistance of
counsel appeal, failed); Decker v. Cockrell, No. 7198-CV-085-R, 2002 WL 180888, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 1, 2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel appeal); People v. Hunter, No. 236888, 2003
WL 22112435, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003) (sentencing issues due to the school zone
statute); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 829 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); State v. Sanders, 667
N.W.2d 377 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (requires special hearing to determine if counsel was ineffective
in this manner); Lanier v. State, 826 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); State v. BojorquezOchoa, No. 47474-0-1, 2002 WL 1290180, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2002) (choosing not to
review ineffective assistance of counsel claim); People v. Burton, No. A093289, 2002 WL
1204405, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 5, 2002); State v. Freeman, 796 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Duke v. State, No. M2002-03091-CCA-R3-9C,
2004 WL 578586, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2004); People v. Anderson, No. 241769,2004
WL 103189, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2004); Commonwealth v. Harding, 797 N.E.2d 946
(Mass. Ct. App. 2003); Whitham v. State, No. CR 01-528, 2003 WL 22100472, at *1 (Ark. Sept.
11, 2003); People v. Hunter, No. 236888, 2003 WL 22112435, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11,
2003); People v. Shook, No. 233346, 2002 WL 31379664, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2002);
State v. Higgins, No. 01-1285,2002 WL 31016491, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2002); Exparte
Dwyer, No. 08-01-00059-CR, 2002 WL 28018, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2002); People v.
Brooks, No. 222833, 2001 WL 1545903, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo, No. 03-30124,2004 WL 300423, at * 1 (9th Cir. Feb.
1, 2004) (attempt to withdraw guilty plea in order to raise entrapment defense post-sentencing);
Whitham v. State, No. CR 01-528, 2003 WL 22100472, at *3 (Ark. Sept. 11, 2003) (ineffective
assistance of counsel for recommending plea instead of developing entrapment defense); People
v. Mendez, 784 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (holding counsel ineffective for failing to
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strategy, like defeating the charges on the merits, made the entrapment
defense untenable. In other words, the defendant opted for another strategy
besides entrapment the first time around, either a plea bargain or a
denial/alibi, and used entrapment either as an afterthought or a backup
plan. These are notoriously difficult appeals to win.
Even the appeals regarding jury instructions often involve the defense
being raised too late procedurally for the judge to include it in the
instructions without creating confusion or bias. In these cases, the feeling
comes through again that the defense was an afterthought when the trial
started to go badly.84 Entrapment was not the dominant theory of the
defendant's case in the first place.
There is a paradox, then, between entrapment's official procedural
position to arise at the beginning of the case and the posture it often takes
in practice. There are, of course, strategic reasons for saving entrapment as
a last resort. It usually requires the defendant to admit the allegations, 85 and
to have one's "rap sheet" come in for the jury's review.86 Both of these can
backfire, making the choice to use the defense a gamble. If the defendant
believes the prosecution's case is weak on the merits, entrapment would
not be the first choice, regardless of what the undercover agents did. Once
the defendant loses and is in prison, however, there is little to lose by
adding entrapment to the appeal.
The fact that so many of the entrapment cases arise after conviction,
however, highlights the image of a defense in decline. The paltry numbers
of cases in recent years would be even smaller if one excluded those that
are truly desperate attempts at an ineffective assistance appeal. The weaker
posture of the defense in this context contributes to the result that the
majority of reported entrapment claims fail. The appeals for ineffective
assistance of counsel lose almost invariably, due to the appellant's special

advise client on the entrapment defense); Harris v. State, 806 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (Miss. 2002)
(counsel erroneously advised client); Campbell v. State, 878 So. 2d227, 331 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004);
Johnson v. State, 817 So. 2d 619, 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (denying defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim).
84. The remaining instruction-related appeals are almost always cases where the defense was
asserted half-heartedly (i.e., no supporting evidence was proffered) or contradicted the defendant's
other arguments.
85. The entrapment defense usually includes an admission that the defendant committed the
acts charged, with full intent, but should be excused due to entrapment; a regular defense means
denying either the actions alleged or the requisite criminal intent. Most courts impose restrictions
on inconsistent defenses. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 261-65. The U.S. Supreme Court opened
the door for some inconsistent defenses in Mathews, but many courts still impose some restrictions.
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 65 (1988).
86. "When the entrapment defense is raised, the prosecution may produce evidence
concerning relevant prior acts of the defendant to show predisposition." MARCUS, supranote 1,at
149. Such evidence would normally be inadmissible and can prejudice the jury against the
defendant.
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burden of showing that the neglected strategy would have affected the
outcome.87
In hindsight, courts feel that the entrapment defense would have failed
even if it had arisen at trial. Of course, these cases are self-selected to be
the ones with the most disfavorable facts for claiming entrapment. The
effect on precedent for future defendants can only be deleterious because
they include a recitation of a fact pattern and then a dismissive conclusion:
the defendant did not show that an entrapment defense would have
mattered in this case. 8 Although the holding strictly means only that the
defendant failed to submit enough evidence, the subtle effect is to hint that
similar facts in future cases would make the entrapment defense a waste
of time. The challenges to the jury instructions fare better89 but this is still
not a "silver bullet" for defendants. Many such appeals fail, and those
remanded sometimes express doubt about the likelihood of convincing the
jury on the second try.
Entrapment, then, is often a second-best defense, as indicated by its
continuing place as a backup plan. As mentioned above, asserting
entrapment can be very risky, so the numbers are not terribly surprising in
this sense. It seems that many of the affirmative defenses would present
similar strategic risks, as many involve admission of the alleged actions,
a burden of production or persuasion, and a relaxing of evidentiary
protections. 90 To the extent this is true, many of the affirmative defenses
must be second-best strategies, and would tend to appear frequently as
appeals. We might refer to these as "secondary defenses," given their
strategic and procedural weaknesses.

87. In federal courts, the defendant must show "that but for counsel's failure to request an
entrapment instruction, 'the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Cunigan v.
Hurley, No. 03-3984,2004 WL 540446, at *2 (6th Cir. 2004); "The defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); "[A] defendant
must show that [trial] counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
and that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's representation. People v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797,
799 (1994); butsee State v. Coleman, No. 00-1756,2001 WL 1448026, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.
16, 2001) (reversing and remanding).
88. See, e.g., Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462, 465 (Ist Cir. 2002) ("[T]he evidence at trial
did not come close to demonstrating the sort of government overreaching that would warrant an
entrapment instruction."); People v. Anderson, No. 241769, 2004 WL 103189, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2004) ("Although counsel's trial strategy ultimately failed, it did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, an entrapment defense would have been unsuccessful
because defendant was not entrapped; thus, defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance of
counsel.").
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing where
defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment evidence to jury).
90. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 353-59.

36

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 16

To summarize, the numbers of cases indicate that the entrapment
defense is declining, that the cases are concentrated in a few areas, and that
many of the cases have a weak procedural posture that decreases the
likelihood of success. Legal uncertainty seems to drive the entrapment
numbers; as the rules become well-defined and the odds of prevailing or
losing become more quantifiable, the number of cases goes down. Figure
1 illustrates the numbers of reported cases for both federal and state courts
for the last eleven years and shows the relative proportion of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims related to the defense.
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ENTRAPMENT BY NUMBERS

IV. SENTENCING

ENTRAPMENT AND ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL

Sentencing entrapment provides a poignant illustration of the decline
in entrapment as a defense as well as the role of uncertainty in this area of
law.9 ' Entrapment by estoppel,92 which is a more established defense but
less commonly used, also sheds light on the determinative effects of legal
certainty on certain behaviors and cases.
A. Sentencing Entrapment
The advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines and, to a lesser extent,
codified gradations of felonies and aggravating factor categories, allows
undercover agents to "ratchet up" a crime by design.9 3 For example, those
planning a sting operation can decide the amount of drugs to be bought or
sold,94 or the substance to be sold95 in order to catapult the defendant into
91. See id
92. See id at 47-49.
93. The phrase "ratchet up" seems to have first been used by the Fifth Circuit in a money
laundering case. United States v. Richardson, 925 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,501
U.S. 1237 (1991).
94. See United States v. Lenefesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
defendant argued that the undercover agent's only motive in repeatedly purchasing from her was
to increase her sentence); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607,614(8th Cir. 1991) (recapping the
defendant's contention that he was entrapped by the government's act of fronting money to
purchase a larger quaiity of drugs than the defendant was predisposed to sell); United States v.
Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that "[t]he Court finds it not at all
fortuitous that the agent arrested the defendant only after he had arranged enough successive buys
to reach the magic number (in reference to the 50 grams of cocaine, which doubles the minimum
mandatory sentence from 5 years to 10 years)"), vacated,990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993); People v.
Cousins, No. 239767, 2003 WL 22222056, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2003) (holding that the
defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when he was asked to supply a larger quantity
of cocaine for the third transaction); State v. Burnett, No. C9-98-1201, 1999 WL 289221, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (holding that it was not enough to establish sentencing entrapment
when the undercover agent had contacted her supervisor before making the last sale to determine
if the addition of that amount would establish a first degree offense).
95. Often times a claim of sentencing entrapment arises under circumstance where an
undercover agent requests the defendant to transform powder cocaine into cocaine base or to
provide the agent with cocaine base rather than powder cocaine. Cocaine base carries a higher
penalty under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 120-135 months, whereas powder cocaine carries
a sixty month minimum mandatory sentence. Cocaine base is crack cocaine, powder cocaine can
be "cooked" in a microwave to become crack. See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1330 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (holding that a request by a government agent for crack cocaine upon a seller's delivery
ofpowder cocaine, does not warrant reversal of a conviction); United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270,
280 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the defendant's contention that downward departure from the
Guidelines is warranted due to the undercover agent's encouragement of having the defendant
transform the powder cocaine into crack); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 112
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a higher sentencing range. This sometimes makes the difference of decades
on a sentence. Other cases involve an agent suggesting that the defendant
come to the transaction heavily armed since the presence of firearms often
generates a sentencing enhancement. 9 Similarly, agents posing as decoys
for pedophiles in Internet chat rooms ascribe an age to themselves that is
just young enough to implicate the most serious category of attempted
sexual predation, while not so young as to limit the appeal to the most
radical perpetrators.97
The idea of agents planning and scheming around the specific
provisions of the sentencing guidelines strikes many as an abuse.9 8 Some

(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the undercover agent's insistence that the purchase of cocaine was
conditioned on the defendant transforming the cocaine powder into crack was impermissible
because this demand did not further the investigation); United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324,2003
WL 1090706, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2003) (reiterating the defendant's claim that the informant
both induced him to sell crack rather than powdered cocaine and manipulated his sentence by
making repeat purchases from him).
96.. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (establishing a minimum five year enhancement for the use of
a firearm in drug trafficking, ten years if the firearm is a short-barreled shotgun, or thirty years if
the firearm is a machine gun or a gun equipped with a silencer).
97. This tactic does not have to rely on subjectivity or passions of judges exclusively, of
course; sometimes the grading of punishments or sentencing guideline enhancements are explicit
and are drawn at somewhat arbitrary lines. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain
a two-level enhancement for attempts to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor or an
undercover agent posing as a minor or an adult with custody of the minor. U.S. FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2(b)(3)(B); see United States v. McGraw, 351 F.3d 443,
445 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving Internet and child pornography); United States v. Robertson, 350
F.3d 1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines do not draw a distinction
between someone posing as a child over the Internet or someone posing as a panderer, so no
distinction should be drawn between the two); United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256,259 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that Internet advertising for child pornography is not an abuse of power). The
Sentencing Guidelines explicitly state that for pedophiliac computer crimes, it does not matter
whether there was a real "victim" or merely an undercover agent posing as a victim. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3. 1, cmt., application n. 1. The prospect of sentencing enhancement, or
sentencing entrapment, may be one of the more important distinctions between the exclusionary
rules and the entrapment defense, at least in practical terms from the vantage point of deterring the
police. Violation of an exclusionary rule may be the end of the case for that defendant; but the idea
ofsentencing entrapment means that even where undercover agents have botched the case regarding
one charge, they can keep going and get the defendant on others, with a little more inducement.
98. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was created to remedy the level ofjudicial discretion
in determining sentence duration. Therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines established minimum
mandatory sentences for drug transactions, focusing on the quantity and type of drugs involved in
the exchange. Many scholars have noted that the new system has now shifted the discretion and
abuse to the prosecutors and undercover agents that determine the amount of drugs sold, types of
drugs sold, and who to target. See, e.g., Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 187, 205, 214 (1993) (arguing that the Sentence Guidelines create an
increase in the severity of punishment and double prison populations nationwide); Andrew G.
Deiss, Comment, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment: PrearrestSentence Manipulation by
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courts, therefore, entertain arguments that the defendant's sentence should
be mitigated to offset the increase that state agents manipulated.99 The
conviction itself stands, but the sentence can be for less time' if the case
meets the applicable test.'0 '
Not surprisingly, there are two rival tests, generally tracking the
subjective and objective tests for regular entrapment. Most of the-courts
Investigators Underthe Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419,419-20 (1994) (stating
that the minority view is that the Guidelines give the undercover agents too much discretion, the
majority opinion is that the Guidelines give the prosecutors too much discretion); Joan Malmud,
Comment, Defending A Sentence: The Judicial Establishment of Sentencing Entrapment and
Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1359, 1361-66 (1997) (discussing the
history of abuse in sentencing and the possible remedies); Mark Thomas, Note and Comment,
Sentencing Entrapment: How Far Should the Federal Courts Go?, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 147, 182
(1996) (discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and arguing that sentencing entrapment should
not be used for "straight stings").
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2003) ("[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described."); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that before the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines courts could prevent sentencing
entrapment by voicing their discretion in sentencing, however under the Guidelines "courts can
ensure that the sentences imposed reflect the defendants' degree of culpability only if they are able
to reduce the sentences of defendants who are not predisposed to engage in deals as large as those
induced by the government.").
100. United States v. Palo, No. 97-50167, 1999 WL 51507, at *1 (9th Cir. June 22, 1999)
(stating that the Ninth Circuit has identified two available remedies for valid sentencing entrapment
claims: 1) "a sentencing court may decline to apply the statutory penalty provision for the greater
offense that the defendant was induced to commit, and instead apply the penalty provision for the
lesser offense that the defendant was predisposed to commit[;]" or 2) "a sentencing court may
exercise its discretion to depart downward from the sentencing range for the greater offense that the
defendant was induced to commit.").
101. Circuits that recognize sentencing entrapment use similar tests that revolve around
predisposition. See United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2001)) ("when the government causes a
defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense"); United
States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103,
1106 (9th Cir. 1994)) ("[W]hen a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser
offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment."); United States
v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing five factors used to determine sentencing
entrapment: "(1) the character or reputation and previous conduct of the defendant; (2) whether the
government made the initial suggestion of criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in
the activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the
government's inducement"); United States v. Padilla, No. CNA. 03-CV-85, 2003 WL 22016886,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2003) (stating that the Eighth Circuit defines "sentencing entrapment as
'outrageous official conduct' that overcomes the volition of an individual who was predisposed to
commit a less serious crime and unduly influences them to commit a more serious crime for the
purpose of increasing the resulting sentence of the entrapped defendant") (citing United States v.
Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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categorize the issue as "sentencing entrapment" and use a predisposition
test: was the defendant predisposed to commit the crime to the degree
charged (i.e., to buy or sell the full quantity of drugs involved), or
something less, but for the agent's inducement? °2 The burden is on the
defendant to prove his reticence.' Other courts" ° focus instead on what
they call "sentencing manipulation" and look solely at whether the
undercover agents themselves deployed any outrageous tactics to induce
the defendant into committing a greater crime. This is much like the
objective test for regular entrapment.0 5 A few courts apparently consider

102. See United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir 2003) (citing Staufer, 38 F.3d at
1106) (stating that "[s]entencing entrapment occurs when a defendant is predisposed to commit a
lesser crime, but is entrapped into committing a more significant crime that is subject to more severe
punishment because of government conduct."); United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th
Cir. 1996) (stating that sentencing entrapment may occur where outrageous government conduct
overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs, for the
purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and the resulting sentence imposed against the
defendant); United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Warren, 16 F.3d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1994)) (stating that sentencing entrapment "may occur where
outrageous government conduct overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small
quantities of drugs, for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and the resulting sentencing
imposed against that defendant"); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating
that "sentencing entrapment posits the situation where defendant, although predisposed to commit
a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater
punishment.").
103. See United States v. Nieto-Cruz, No. 03-50420, 2004 WL 886346, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb.
11, 2004) (stating that the defendant failed to meet his btirden of proving that "he had neither the
intent nor the ability to produce the amount of drugs involved."); United States v. Medina, No. 9910332, 2002 WL 1808705, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2002) (citing United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d
245,250 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1995)) (stating that "[tihe defendant bears the burden of showing sentencing
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence."); Naranjo, 52 F.3d at 250 n.13 (stating "[i]n
making a sentencing entrapment claim, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate both the lack
of intent to produce and the lack of the capability to produce the quantity of drugs at issue.").
104. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. 3-97-CR-213-R, 2002 WL 1896932, at *10
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2002) (recognizing sentence manipulation but has not used the doctrine to
depart downward from the Guidelines).
105. "Outrageous government conduct" is used sometimes instead of "sentencing
manipulation," and may result in an acquittal rather than a lower sentence, even though it addresses
the same basic phenomenon of undercover agents ratcheting up the sentence as the sting operation
proceeds. Acquitting a defendant outright can serve no other purpose than possibly punishing the
police, which I have argued elsewhere is misguided public policy. Acquittals do not deter police
because police are focused on arrests rather than convictions. There is little economic or
psychological basis for assuming that the police suffer disutility when a third party (like a
defendant) receives a benefit or increased utility. The type of police most likely to engage in
reprehensible conduct are the least likely to be deterred by such an abstract form of punishment;
and that the potential for greater payoffs in some cases outweighs the inconvenience of acquittals
in other cases. See generally Stevenson, supra note 17; see also Padilla,2003 WL 22016886, at
*5 (stating that "[s]entencing manipulation by definition is not a defense.... [and] has no bearing
on the defendant's guilt or innocence. Succeeding under this theory will result in the court granting
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both, 106 but the failure rate of these defensive maneuvers makes this point
almost moot.'07 "Sentencing entrapment" is the far more common approach
and term.'0 8 In the academic literature, "sentencing entrapment" is a
general phrase used to describe the whole area - the agents' tactic itself,
the defense, and the body of cases or concept - rather than to describe one
test as opposed to another.
This phrase seems to have been coined by the Eighth Circuit in the
1991 case United States v. Lenfesty. 1°9 At the time, this was a novel
argument from a defendant and it did not go over well: "We are not
prepared to say there is no such animal as 'sentencing entrapment.'" ' 0 The
same week, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in another ruling, United
States v. Stuart,'1 ' this time less dismissively: "Perhaps there is such a
thing as 'sentencing entrapment,' but we are not persuaded that [the
defendant] has succeeded in establishing it.""' A slow onslaught of cases

a downward offense level adjustment under the guidelines."); State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 305
(Minn. 1997) (stating that "[s]entencing manipulation is outrageous government conduct aimed
only at increasing a person's sentence. Whereas sentencing entrapment focuses on the
predisposition of the defendant, the related concept of sentencing manipulation is concerned with
the conduct and motives of government officials.").
106. See Padilla,2003 WL 22016886, at *7 (stating that "the First Circuit[ ] commingle[s]
the sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment doctrines."); Dehaney v. United States, No.
97 CR. 545(BSJ), 2001 WL 1242289, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2001) (noting that the Second
Circuit recognizes sentence manipulation but also requires that one must necessarily prove that "he
was not predisposed to commit the offense.").
107. See United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "garden variety
manipulation claims are largely a waste oftime," because "sentencing factor manipulation is a claim
only for the extreme and unusual case.").
108. The First Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation
to describe the same conduct. Padilla,2003 WL 22016886, at *5(quoting United States v. Woods,
210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2000)). The Eighth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit use the
term sentencing entrapment and have recognized the defense. Id. at *5, *6. The D.C. Circuit
recognized sentencing entrapment in United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1994).
The First Circuit and Second Circuit recognize sentence manipulation. Padilla, 2003 WL
22016886, at *5, *7 (citing Woods, 210 F.3d at 75; Dehaney, 2001 WL 1242289, at *5). In United
States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit recognized the existences
of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, however the viability of either defense was not
addressed. For more discussion, see Malmud, supranote 98, at 1372-75 (distinguishing between
the doctrines of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, also noting that the Sixth Circuit
and Eighth Circuit have recognized the existence of some form of the sentence manipulation
doctrine); Todd E. Witten, Comment, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government
Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 709-30 (1996)
(discussing the evolution and history behind the different circuits' treatment of sentencing
entrapment and sentence manipulation).
109. 923 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 968 (1991).
110. Id. at 1300.
111. 923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
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ensued in various circuits over the next year. The first court to recognize
"such an animal" as sentencing entrapment was a district court in
1 3 in which the district court found
Minnesota, in UnitedStates v. Barth,"
that the Sentencing Commission had "failed to adequately consider the
terrifying capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based' on the
114
investigating officer's determination of when to make the arrest.
The lower federal courts are split on whether to recognize sentencing
entrapment at all," 5 meaning the U.S. Supreme Court may have to settle
the question. A few circuits have not yet considered the question." 6 Those
that do recognize it in theory generally reject it in individual cases." 7
Individual defendants often appear unsympathetic, given that they set out
to commit some crime, and the government agent simply orchestrated an
113. 788 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1992).
114. Id.at 1057.
115. United States v. Padilla, No. CIV.A.03-CV-85, 2003 WL 22016886, at * 5, *7 (E.D. Pa.
June 20, 2003) (stating that the circuits are split on both the sentence entrapment doctrine and the
sentence manipulation doctrine); see United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting sentence manipulation as a matter of law); United States v. Perez, Crim. A. No. 94-019201, 1996 WL 502292, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996) (quoting United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d
668, 673 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit rejects sentencing entrapment as a
matter of law.)
116. Padilla,2003 WL 22016886 at * 6, *8 (citing United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428,438
(3d Cir. 1994)) (noting that to date, the Third Circuit has not recognized sentencing entrapment or
manipulation).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant was predisposed to commit an
offense involving 100 kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Rice, No. 02-1383, 2004 WL
1240824, at *3, *4 (10th Cir. June 7, 2004) (rejecting the defendant's sentencing factor
manipulation claim that he was improperly induced into manufacturing and selling twenty machine
guns because of the government's fronting him with the money to purchase supplies); United States
v. Vega, Nos. 02-50253, 02-50499, 2004 WL 785311, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2004) (holding that
the defendant was not entitled to reduction of his sentence because he was "predisposed to sell in
amounts up to whatever he could handle, including the 233-gram sale"); United States v.
Hightower, No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 729255, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004) (holding that the
defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when the agent specifically asked for crack
when he had knowledge that the defendant could also supply other drugs which carried less
penalty); United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
defendant was predisposed to distribute cocaine by his admittance of supplying two kilograms to
individuals intended for them to resell it); United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 476-77 (7th Cir.
2001) (rejecting defendant's claim that he was offered bargain basement prices for cocaine, given
generous credit terms to accept the larger amount even though he originally requested a much
smaller amount, and that he only had enough money on him to purchase 3.75 kilograms of the 5
kilogram purchase); United States v. Case, 217 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161-62 (D. Me. 2002) (rejecting
the defendant's claim that his sentence should be reduced for the final sale, which occurred after
the agents could have arrested him for making a ten pound sale); United States v. Lora, 129 F.
Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the defendants were predisposed to buy cocaine and
were not offered "artificially favorable credit terms" that induced them to purchase more cocaine
than they had resources for).
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incremental escalation. ' I have some suggestions to offer for the approach
the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt if it does have the opportunity to
address the issue in the near future. The opportunity may not arise,
however, if the current decline in cases continues.
B. Decline in Sentencing Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment cases reached their peak in the federal courts in
1996-1997, and the cases have dropped off steadily since then. In addition,
the claims do not fare well at all. In the mid- 1990s sentencing entrapment
seemed like the new, fresh area of entrapment law. It now has the same
earmarks 9of decline, disuse, and discredit as the traditional entrapment
defense.1
C. Risk, Uncertainty,and Sentences
The 1996-1997 peak in sentencing entrapment cases, followed by a
drop-off in numbers, provides a vivid illustration of the effects of legal
uncertainty on criminal litigation. As mentioned above, the idea of
sentencing entrapment first appeared in the Lenfesty case in 1991.12° More
defense attorneys attempted to raise the argument nationwide over the next
several years. Most of the early holdings created a state of almost "perfect"
legal uncertainty: the court recognized that the defense of sentencing
118. As discussed by the district court in UnitedStates v. Kaczmarski, the difference between
sentence entrapment and manipulation may be significant due to the possibility that even if a
sentencing entrapment defense is not available to a defendant that is predisposed to commit a
greater crime, a sentence manipulation claim might still be available. United States v. Kaczmarski,
939 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1996); but see Garcia,79 F.3d at 76 (quoting United States v. Baker,
63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995)) (stating that Seventh Circuit rejects sentence manipulation
because the government "must be permitted to exercise its own judgment in determining at what
point in an investigation enough evidence has been obtained.").
119. Combining the state and federal cases, the numbers are as follows: 2001-2004 = 86 cases,
2003-2004 = 30,2002-2003 = 27,2001-2002 = 29, 1998-2001 = 107 cases, 2000-2001 = 31, 19992000 = 32, 1998-1999 = 44, 1995-1998 = 147 cases, 1997-1998 = 47, 1996-1997 = 60, 1995-1996
= 40, 1994-1995 = 30 cases. From the numbers, it seems like 1996-1997 was the year for
sentencing entrapment cases. Before and after 1996-1997 the numbers remain fairly steady but are
decreasing. Note that this includes some cases that procedurally occurred as an appeal for
ineffective assistance or counsel due to counsel not arguing the defense at district court level. See,
e.g., United States v. Romero, 85 Fed. Appx. 178, 180 (10th Cir. 2004) (defendant unsuccessfully
tying ineffective assistance claim to post-sentencing assertion of); People v. Mills, 2004 WL
787145, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (unsuccessful claim that lawyer's failure to assert various
applications of a "sentencing entrapment" defense was ineffective assistance); United States v.
Nanez, 83 Fed. Appx. 271,273 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Call, 73 Fed. Appx. 268, 275 (9th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Barnes, 228 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88-89 (2002); United States v. Franco, 826
F. Supp. 1168, 1169-72 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to
raise sentencing entrapment defense, which had not then been recognized in the Seventh Circuit).
120. United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991).
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entrapment might exist, although no fact pattern had yet arisen that would
suffice - including the case at bar. "2 ' This atmosphere of uncertainty
functioned as a "green light" for defendants to try this claim, with no way
of knowing whether the facts of their case would foreclose the option. As
more of these cases made their way through the appeal process,122 the rules
121. See, e.g., United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1995) (expressing that the
validity of the defense has not been determined, even if it was, the defendant was predisposed to
launder proceeds from illegal activity with the knowledge that it was probably drug money); United
States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1995) (choosing not to address the viability
of the theory due to the facts of the case); United States v. Wright, No. 93-4228, 1995 WL 101300,
at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995) (declining to address the issue of accepting the sentencing entrapment
doctrine, because even in a court that accepts the doctrine, the facts of the case would not support
a claim); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that sentencing
entrapment is a viable theory, defendant failed to present evidence that outrageous conduct
occurred); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging the existence
of the defense and elaborating upon it, but holding that the facts of the case do not warrant the
defense).
122. Between 1994 and 1996, numerous sentence entrapment cases were addressed on appeal.
For examples of cases, see Figueroa v. United States, 19 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.
Satterwhite, 23 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding defendant's entrapment defense not reviewable); United States v. Broomfield, 103 F.3d
131 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Murphy, 16 F.3d 1222 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 97 F.3d 1455 (7th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Castellanos, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garcia, 53 F.3d 334 (7th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Okoro, 42 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1994); Roldan v. United States, 33 F.3d
56 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 309 (7th Cir. 1994) (affiriming sentencing
judgment of the lower court); United States v. Shipley, 62 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Doyle, 60 F.3d 396, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that government did not engage in
outrageous government conduct by offering the defendant leniency in exchange for cooperation to
lead to a more culpable drug dealer); United States v. Clark, 36 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Merical, 32 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that the record failed to support that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law,
and that the issue of entrapment was properly submitted to the jury); United States v. McLinn, 19
F.3d 24 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Warren, 16 F.3d 247,250-51 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
the government's repeated undercover purchases of drugs from the defendant does not constitute
outrageous conduct); United States v. Appel, 105 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1996); Noble v. United States,
105 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lutz, 103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Mitchell, 103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lee, 99 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. McCord, 99 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bui, 97 F.3d 1461 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning a
government sting operation for manufacturing and selling counterfeit credit cards); United States
v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the trial courts' decision that the
defendant was a victim of sentencing entrapment but reversed defendants sentence because the trial
court failed to adjust his sentencing); United States v. Brown, 73 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Ashley, 72 F.3d 135 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Graves, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Gamboa, 66 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Chavez-Vasquez, 64 F.3d
667 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Davis,
56 F.3d 74 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Simpson, 64 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
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became clarified, comments to the sentencing guidelines were added and
judicially noticed, and more defendants could predict the outcome of the
claims ahead of time. This led to a decrease in the number of cases.
Sentencing entrapment and regular entrapment are conceptually
distinct. The former is a mitigating factor for punishments, while the latter
allows the defendant to go free if the claim is successful. 123 Yet there must
be some interplay between the two, as evidenced by the fact that the tests
for sentencing entrapment are simply adaptations of the two tests for
regular entrapment. 12 Obviously, courts have been influenced by
traditional entrapment law in crafting rules for these newer types of cases.
What may be less obvious is the fact that sentencing entrapment cases
can influence future decisions on regular entrapment. Courts in sentencing
entrapment cases are still defining the boundaries and subtleties of
"predisposition," "inducement vs. opportunity," and "outrageous
government conduct," the elements of the traditional defense under
alternative rules. The precedents established are not irrelevant or
completely distinguishable. "Predisposition" is being used in almost the
same way, semantically, whether it is the predisposition to go from selling

v. Arvizo, 53 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Banh, 33 D.3d 60 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Gibbs, 15 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. Garcia, 79 F.3d at 75 (distinguishing between "sentencing manipulation" and the
objective test or outrageous government conduct.)
124. For examples of the objective approach to sentence entrapment (referred to as sentence
manipulation), see United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1 st Cir. 1994) ("When an accusation
of sentencing factor manipulation surfaces, the judicial gaze should, in the usual case, focus
primarily - though not necessarily exclusively - on the government's conduct and motives.");
United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992) (hinting that sentence manipulation
may occur even if the facts of the case are "insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment
defense... or [a] due process claim .... ); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir.
1994) (internal citations omitted) (linking sentence manipulation to outrageous government conduct
and holding that a successful manipulation claim only arises when "outrageous government conduct
that offends due process could justify a reduced sentence."); United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238,
240 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[s]entencing manipulation occurs when the government engages
in improper conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant's sentence."). For examples of the
subjective approach to sentence entrapment, see United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen 'a defendant,
although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater
offense subject to greater punishment."'); United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377
(7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466,463-74 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hen the
government causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more
serious offense."); United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations
omitted) (stating the five factors used in determining sentencing entrapment: "I) the character or
reputation of the defendant; 2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal
activity; 3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; 4) whether the defendant
showed any reluctance; and 5) the nature of the government's inducement.").
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no drugs to one gram, or to go from selling nine grams to ten; in either
case, it means something like readiness, willingness, or a lack of resistance
to lawbreaking.'25 The problem is that sentencing entrapment cases are bad
test cases for these concepts. The defendants are so unsympathetic that
some courts refuse to recognize the defense, 126 and those which do usually
refuse to apply it in a given case. 27 The precedents generated will be
almost uniformly unfavorable. Still a definition of "predisposition"
generated in a sentencing entrapment case would be appropriate to cite as
authority in the traditional type of case, as the word is being used in the
same sense. The influence of bad test cases on the core concepts of the
defense will cause a shift over time that is unfavorable to defendants.
The other problem is that despite the nearly complete semantic overlap
between the two occurrences of"predisposition 121(both types of cases use
the term to refer to a lack of resistance on the defendant's part to an offer,
request, or suggestion from an undercover agent), there is an important
1

125. See, e.g., Biggs v. United States, No. 99-5238, 2001 WL 128413, at *2-*3 (6th Cir. Feb.
6,2001):
[T]he record reveals that Biggs was predisposed to deal in distribution-sized
quantities of methamphetamine. Biggs was charged following the execution of a
reverse-sting operation in which the government sold four pounds of
methamphetamine to Biggs and his co-defendant. Biggs sought to purchase the
drugs so that he could resell them in Memphis, Tennessee. Biggs met an informant
at a nightclub and gave the informant $2,000 for the purchase. Later, during a
telephone conversation that was recorded, the informant stated that he felt a
pressing need to be rid of the four pounds of methamphetamine he was about to
possess and that Biggs could have all four pounds for $5,000. Biggs accepted the
bargain, delivered $2,500 to make the purchase, and was arrested after he and his
co-defendant took possession of all four pounds of methamphetamine.
At sentencing, Biggs stated that it was never his "intention to buy four pounds
of crystal meth." He stated that, "If they had not been practically give [sic] to me,
I wouldn't be in the trouble I am now."
126. See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668,673 (11 th Cir. 1992) ("[A]s a matter of law,
we reject Duke's sentence entrapment theory.... [b]ecause this circuit rejects this theory as a
defense, we need not address it further.").
127. See United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324, 2003 WL 1090706, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 12,
2003); United States v. Brown, No. 02-4741, 2003 WL 21541050, at *2 (4th Cir. July 9, 2003);
United States v. Jernigan, Nos. 01-2121,01-2304,2003 WL 463483, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 18,2003);
United States v. Bew, No. 03-2931, 2004 WL 1178196, at *2 (7th Cir. May 26, 2004); United
States v. Parks, No. 03-2844, 2004 WL 87659, at *4 (8th Cir. Jan. 21, 2004); United States v.
Searcy, No. 02-2882, 2003 WL 282449, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 11, 2003); United States v. Ross, No.
02-50226, 2004 WL 1375522 (9th Cir. June 21, 2004); United States v. Villa-Serrano, No. 0330210, 2003 WL 22954240, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2003); United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229
(11 th Cir. 2004) (finding that one defendant out of the five defendants in the case on appeal should
have his sentence vacated and remanded); United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
128. The same analysis could be applied to the other core terms as well.
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difference that most people would recognize but find difficult to articulate.
A predisposition to commit a crime in the first place seems greater in
degree than a predisposition to move from selling nine grams of drugs to
ten. 9.The latter is merely an incremental change. The former, in contrast,
seems to be a step from one category into another, from non-criminal to
criminal, from not guilty to guilty. This is a large semantic step. Sentencing
entrapment cases involve a move from criminal or guilty to slightly more
criminal or more guilty.
The sentencing guidelines and codified gradations of felonies, however,
transform this incremental step into a qualitative change. The increased
certainty of the legal rules alters the semantic play of the terms. The
consequences are significant - if the circuit court decides the term is
applicable, it can mean a difference of several years in prison. 13 Now both
uses of predisposition refer to a line between significant categories - the
legal significance is no longer picayune and incremental even though the
action seems incrementally different to the actor at the time. The legal rules
frame the situation differently than the actor in the commission of the
offense. The undercover agents will be more aware of this phenomenon
than the offender will. The problem is that there is no linguistic wall or
boundary to keep a court's application of "predisposition" to one set of
factors from affecting its application to another type of case. This is
different from the specialized uses of other legal terms like "agreement,"
which may have distinct meanings depending on whether it is a criminal
case or a contracts case. With entrapment, the combination of semantic
blurring between the core terms across different types of entrapment cases,
and the semantic effect caused by codified, mechanical punishment factors,
creates a linguistic effect that pushes all entrapment cases away from
favoring defendants.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines themselves present an interesting
study in the effects of legal uncertainty. The guidelines were created with

129. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizo, 1995 WL 261137, at *3-*4 (9th Cir. May 3, 1995)
(change from one kilo to four).
130. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (1995), and the explanation offered
by Professor Neal Katyal:
[O]ne kilo of crack yields a 188-235 month sentence and one kilo of heroin yields
121-151 months. The four level enhancement increases a crack sentence to 292365 months - an average increase of about ten years. The enhancement increases
a heroin sentence, however, to 188-235 months, a much smaller increase of about
six years.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385, 2422 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
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the purpose of limiting judicial discretion.'31 The drafters and proponents
of the guidelines feared that too much judicial discretion allowed for
abuses, or at least disparities in punishments, and such disparities seemed
unfair. 132 Indeed, legal vagueness does confer greater discretion on the
relevant state actors. For example, in administrative law, enabling statutes
containing vague, open-ended terms serve to delegate authority from the
legislature to agency officials.'3 3 With the sentencing guidelines, the
original thought was to re-appropriate punishment discretion from judges
to the legislature.' 34
Many judges and commentators believe this process backfired,
resulting in more unfair and draconian punishments than before.' 35 In
addition, many commentators on sentencing entrapment blame the

131. See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1958; Robert S. Johnson, Note, The Ills of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Search for a Cure: Using Sentence Entrapment to Combat
Governmental Manipulationof Sentencing, 49 VAND. L. REV. 197, 201-09 (1996); Daniel L.
Abelson, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment:An Overview AndAnalysis, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 773,
776 (2003) ("Before enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had almost completely unfettered
discretion in imposing sentences, the exercise of which was generally not reviewable on appeal.").
132. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972)
(describing "almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers" possessed by judges in determining
sentencing); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems andSentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federaland State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1997) (discussing sentencing
review in the federal system); Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1959.
133. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory
Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1107-08 (1995). Eskridge and Levi argue that
governmental discretion or decision-making is often delegated through what they call "regulatory
variables," linguistic devices in the statute that leave the delegated interpreter a range of meanings
and applications. See id. (they eventually shift to the term "regulatory variability" out of fear that
readers will imagine a list of magic words that delegate discretion). It is well-established that the
legislature intends to delegate some of its authority to agencies; the focus here is on the mechanism
for delegation, which is essentially a linguistic one. Some portions of enabling statutes may be
specific and directive, other provisions contain ambiguity, requiring the authorized official or
administrator to exercise discretion to fill in the gaps or flesh out the practical meaning. This
linguistic feature of vagueness or ambiguity inherently delegates authority. As Eskridge and Levi
observe, "The level of linguistic generality permits an inference about the speaker's willingness to
delegate gap-filling discretion to another person (i.e., police officers and judges). The more general
the statutory term, the more discretion the directive is implicitly vesting in the implementing
official." Id. at 1111 (noting that this discretion may be "vested deliberately or inadvertently").
134. Although the nondelegation doctrine has received a fair amount of treatment in the
academic literature, there seems to be a mirror-image phenomenon that we might call an
"undelegation" doctrine, by which Congress uses greater specificity and detail in its enactment to
appropriate more power for itself and away from other branches of government or the citizenry at
large. A thorough discussion of this issue, however, is outside our scope here.
135. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (discussing the sentencing
process); Jose A. Cabranes, IncoherentSentencing Guidelines,WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, atAl 1;
Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A DismalFailure,N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2.
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sentencing guidelines for the phenomenon of agents ratcheting up
punishments during stings. These commentators claim that the sentencing
guidelines simply shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors and law
enforcement.'36
This conclusion is misguided. Legal uncertainty was blamed for being
the vehicle by which too much delegation of discretion and authority took
place. This is a plausible enough argument. It seems paradoxical, then, to
argue that a lack of uncertainty or vagueness confers or delegates
discretion on a different branch of government. Normally, power is
delegated to enforcement agencies through vague, open-ended statutes,just
as it was with the judiciary before the guidelines were in place. The
confusion here is that the issues are being framed in terms of discretion,
which is really a problem of legal vagueness and agency costs. Instead, the
issue should be framed as one of legal certainty, which is a problem of
informational asymmetries and the abolition of windfall benefits in isolated
cases. Prosecutors and undercover agents did not receive more discretion
after the enactment of the guidelines. They were just as free to suggest that
a target bring a firearm to a set-up drug deal before as they are now. If
anything, prosecutors and agents have less freedom and discretion now
because there are mechanical rules controlling the outcomes, around which
they must plan. The guidelines merely afforded some possible incentives
that influence strategy. The world of both judges and prosecutors alike is
less free and discretionary; everything is more pre-determined.137 Greater
certainty, however, completely changes investment decisions of state
actors, as well as their strategy games when moving toward trial.

136. See supranote 131 (citing sources therein).
137. But see WaLtAM D. RICH ET AL., SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICS: AN EVALUATION OFTHE
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES 159-60 (1982) (a study

of localized experiments that predates the enactment of the federal guidelines):
[T]hese diverse measures almost unanimously converge on a single conclusion:
sentencing guidelines have had no detectable, objectively manifested impact on
the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion.
Judges frequently departed from the sentencing recommended by the guidelines.
Denver judges rarely provided written reasons for their departures. There was no
clear increase in the proportion of sentences that fell within the guidelines'
prescriptions. Racial and sexual disparities, where extant before guidelines,
showed no signs of reduction. Neither was there a significant diminution of
statistically unexplained variation in sentences. Sentencing guidelines did not
enhance the predictability of sentences.
The authors concede, however, that in each of the experimental settings, compliance with the
suggested guidelines was voluntary and there was no sanction for a judge ignoring the
recommendations. The authors posited that the results would be different if compliance could be
enforced. Id.
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When sentences were uncertain, the world of punishments was
comparable to a Knightian market where future demands are uncertain.
Under Frank Knight's model,' 38 uncertainty is the only environment where
true entrepreneurial profits can occur. These "true profits" are analogous
to occasional windfall benefits for defendants in the form of acquittals. It
is true that the lack of sentencing guidelines conferred discretion onjudges,
allowing them to express their own preferences, but the result for
defendant was an occasionally lucky break, a shower of mercy, or an
occasional unfortunate turn. Frank Knight's model of differentiating
between risk and uncertainty for the purposes of results and investments
implies that greater certainty in the outcomes flattens out any profits across
the board. As outcomes become more predictable, uncertainty shifts
toward straightforward, quantifiable risk.
Fixing the payouts of punishment eliminates extreme turns in fortune
and levels off the possible "lucky breaks" to defendants. Thus, the
sentencing guidelines appear to impose more draconian results. At the
same time, Knight's model concludes that uncertainty in outcomes
probably generates a net loss across the whole system because the losses
of all the failed entrepreneurs taken together must outweigh the windfall
profits ofoccasional winners. 139 Highly predictable outcomes flatten profits
but probably result in an incremental net increase in societal wealth,
because the increase in transactions with better information allows for
increasingly efficient allocations of wealth and resources. 4 '
This means that the advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines would
result in most cases settling as plea bargains, 4 ' and defendants overall
being slightly better off, but getting no breaks. The sentencing guidelines
in this sense probably benefit defendants overall, very incrementally, but
an individual defendant has far less chance of mercy or a lucky break.
That is only part of the picture, however, because in criminal law, the
individual is always pitted against the state. This match is in place even
before the decision to commit crime occurs. Greater specificity in legal
rules tends to benefit parties who are more established and have greater
access to ex ante legal information, enabling them to plan around rules or
exploit loopholes in the rules.' 42 Administrative regulations, for example,
are usually more burdensome for would-be market entrants in the regulated
industry than those already established. 4 1 In contexts where the individual

138.
139.
140.
141.

See generally KNIGHT, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
For more discussion if the strategy influences on the high plea bargain rate, see RICHARD

A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 365-67 (2001).

142. See Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35.
143. Id.

ENTRAPMENT BY NUMBERS

is pitted against the state, greater legal certainty will almost always benefit
the state and disadvantage the individual. This scenario may be better for
society overall, and therefore beneficial to most individuals in society, as
its overall wealth increases incrementally. However, the individual in an
adversarial position to the state can only get lucky if there is legal
uncertainty. This is a matter of informational asymmetries and the
disparate position to exploit loopholes created by specificity in the rules.
Prosecutors and undercover agents learn the rules ahead of time, or by
being repeat players in the game, and plan their decisions around those.'"
Most criminals are in less of a position to do this, and end up losing.'45 The
point here is not to defend or attack the guidelines, but to explain that this
is not a matter of increased discretion for law enforcement, but the result
of advantages that legal certainty brings to the informationally dominant
party.
If a court is considering a rule to adopt for cases of sentencing
entrapment or manipulation, it seems that "predisposition" is a problematic
test, due to its semantic fluctuations and overlap with other categories of
cases. Similarly, looking at the conduct of agents (the objective/outrageous
government conduct approaches) will usually result in a win for the
prosecution, because the agents are in a position to plan carefully around
the rules. Any wrongdoing on their part will almost always appear to be
nothing more than being more clever than the defendant. Perhaps a better
test is to weigh the disparities in information access. An experienced
criminal or one who "should have known better" should have less leniency
in sentencing entrapment than a true novice to crime. The guidelines, of
course, already have provisions recognizing the defendant's background,
separating first-time offenders from repeat offenders. However, these are
usually downward departures after the sentence has been ratcheted up for
aggravating factors. Thus, enhancements should be subject to a quick-look
approach to screen out setups of true novices.

144. For a discussion of some of the strategic advantages held by prosecutors, and the
incentives motivating their decisions, see POSNER, supranote 14 1, at 365-67. For example, due to
the government's enormous resources, prosecutors can spread these resources out strategically but
unevenly, "extracting guilty pleas by the threat to concentrate its resources against any defendant
who refuses to plead and using the resources thus conserved to wallop the occasional defendant
who does invoke his right to a trial." Id. at 367.
145. Admittedly, certain types of criminals, like those perpetrating computer crimes, are very
well-networked and informed of law enforcement policies. The vast majority of entrapment cases,
however, involve drug crimes, and these defendants are not necessarily characterized by expertise
in the law.
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D. EntrapmentBy Estoppel

Entrapment by estoppel involves no subterfuge and no undercover
agents, unlike traditional entrapment. 4 6 The defense applies instead to
situations where there was some official assurance of the legality of a

certain action'4 7 by an appropriately authorized state actor'4 8 followed by

a reasonable reliance'49 on the assurance by the defendant and criminal
charges against the defendant for carrying out the action.150 It is, really, the

146. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 447-48. Marcus notes that "much of the rationale for the
claim implicates due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Id.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936,939 (4th Cir. 1997) (defendant
required to show "active misleading" bygovernment); United States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d
464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Krzeszowski, 24 P.3d 485, 489-90 (Wash. App. 2001) ("active
representation" by government agent required); see also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 48-49.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46,49-50 (1st Cir. 2002) (firearm violation);
United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court properly
refused to instruct the jury on entrapment because there was not evidentiary support in the record);
United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (state government official's assurances
cannot be basis of reasonable reliance for federal law firearm regulations); United States v.
Mendoza, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678, at *2, (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2004); People v. Chacon, 12
Cal. Rptr. 3d 211, 219 (2004) (holding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel not available
because the defendant did not rely on a government agent's advice); State v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d
211, 217-18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (presenting elements of the entrapment by estoppel defense);
see also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49.
149. The question of whether the defendant's reliance was reasonable tends to be the most
common point of dispute in the cases. For a good discussion of the doctrine generally and of this
point in particular, see United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating and
remanding to allow crucial evidence to be presented); see also MARCUS, supranote 1, at 48; United
States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2001) (child pornography case, where defendant
claimed he was supplying the government with leads on other violators); State v. Kremlacek, 1999
WL 759970, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999); United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 506-07
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant is not entitled to the entrapment by estoppel defense
because he did not met the element that he was relying on a government agent's advice).
150. A succinct explanation of this defense, distinguishing it from similar strategies a
defendant could use, and is found in United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez:
Several defenses may apply when a defendant claims he performed the acts for
which he was charged in response to a request from an agency of the government
.... First, the defendant may allege that he lacked criminal intent because he
honestly believed he was performing the otherwise-criminal acts in cooperation
with the government. "Innocent intent" is not a defense per se, but a defense
strategy aimed at negating the mens rea for the crime, an essential element of the
prosecution's case .... A second possible defense is "public authority." With this
affirmative defense, the defendant seeks exoneration based on the fact that he
reasonably relied on the authority of a government official to engage him in a
covert activity. . . . The validity of this defense depends upon whether the
government agent in fact had the authority to empower the defendant to perform
the acts in question. If the agent had no such power, then the defendant may not
rest on the "public authority" [defense] . . . A third possible defense . . . is
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criminal-law version of promissory estoppel in contracts. 1 ' The
appellation "entrapment" is somewhat misleading, because there is little
association with the rest of entrapment law.' 52 The challenged actions of
the state agents are nearly always inadvertent, and the agent's association
with the government open and obvious.
Although the defense sounds straightforward enough, many people
would be surprised to learn, in fact, that the defense rarely works,'53 as it

"entrapment by estoppel." This defense applies when a government official tells
a defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant commits what would
otherwise be a crime in reasonable reliance on the official's representation.
United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (1 th Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted); see also United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the above
passage as its own rule). A strange illustration of the foregoing distinctions can be seen operating
in the background of United States v. George, where the prosecution requested that the defendant
be acquitted, if at all, under the theory of entrapment by estoppel, rather than a lack of the requisite
mental state, to avoid creating unfavorable precedent. United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2d Cir.
2001).
151. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 129 (Robert C. Clark

et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003).
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on concepts of equity and fair
dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if
he intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to
rely upon such a belief to his detriment. The elements of the doctrine are that (1)
the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has
a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the
true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.
Id.
152. See Sean Connelly, BadAdvice: The EntrapmentBy EstoppelDoctrinein CriminalLaw,
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627,628 (1994).
Entrapment by estoppel differs markedly from the traditional entrapment defense
because a defendant need not show that a government official "induced" his
conduct but only that the official offered an honest, albeit mistaken, opinion that
the conduct was lawful. Similarly, the defense differs from the "outrageous
government misconduct" defense that some courts have recognized as a matter of
substantive due process in cases where, even though the defendant was criminally
predisposed, the government induced the crime or participated in it through means
that "shock the conscience."
Id.
153. In the last few years, the defense was only successful in one reported federal case, United
States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004). Batterjee was convicted for violating a federal
statute prohibiting non-immigrant aliens from possessing firearms or ammunition. Batterjee was
residing in the States on a student visa. He ordered a pistol and filled out federal Form 4473 to
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usually arises in cases where the defendant cannot meet the test - where
there was either no assurance or no reasonable reliance.'54 Although the
cases cover a wide range of crimes,'55 by its nature the defense is bestsuited for regulatory offenses, especially firearms violations. 5 6 It is

obtain a permit for the weapon, indicating truthfully that he was not a citizen on the forms. He
provided additional materials requested by the gun store owner, a firearms licensee, and assurances
from the store owner that he was completing the license application properly. The statute
prohibiting certain aliens from possessing firearms, however, was amended before the defendant's
gun purchase, making it illegal for him to consummate the purchase, although the instructions on
the application forms were not updated to reflect this change. When prosecuted, Batterjee claimed
that the form and the store owner (a federal licensee) had misled him. The district court rejected this
defense, but his conviction was reversed on appeal. He reasonably relied on the licensee's
representations as to his eligibility to possess a firearm. In state courts, entrapment by estoppel
seems to have succeeded only twice in the last few years, and in one of these cases the acquittal was
reversed on an appeal by the state. People v. Chacon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211 (2004) (successful
defense at trial reversed on appeal); State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808
(Ark. Apr. 8, 2004) (successful estoppel defense where defendant was charged with appropriating
insurance premiums for own use, where state regulators had tacitly condoned the practice).
154. See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49 ("Defendants have had a difficult time demonstrating
that these elements are present.").
155. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) (recent entrapment
by estoppel cases include tax fraud); United States v. Lagrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., No. 03 CR 605,
2004 WL 524438, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2,2004) (food and dairy regulations); United States v. Kapp,
Nov. 6, 2003) (trafficking in endangered
No. 02-CR 418-1, 2003 WL 23162408, at *1 (N.D. I11.
animals/animal products); United States v. Westover, No. 02-40012-01-SAC, 2003 WL 1904046,
at * 1 (D. Kan. Mar. 6, 2003) (defrauding HUD); United States v. Greyling, No. OOCR.63 I(RCC),
2002 WL 424655, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002) (securities fraud); State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No.
CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808, at *1 (Ark. Apr. 8, 2004) (violation of insurance regulations);
People v. Micheau, No. 241076, 2003 WL 22358874, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2003)
(operation of pyramid scheme); Commonwealth v. Cosentino, No. 2122 C.D.2003, 2004 WL
1103678, at * 1 (Pa. Commw. May 13,2004) (election code violations); White v. White, 564 S.E.2d
700 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (violation of alimony orders); United States v. Whitecloud, No. 02-50206,
2003 WL 1459508, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003) (welfare fraud); Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149
F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1998) (operation of nudist club); United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50, 52
(1st Cir. 2001) (child pornography); United States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426, 2004 WL 1147091,
at *1 (2d Cir. May 21, 2004) (drug possession); United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254, 257 (4th
Cir. 2003) (importation and sale of drug paraphernalia); United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52, 54
(2d Cir. 2001) (immigration violations); United States v. Alba, No. 01-2510, 01-2907, 2002 WL
522819, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) (holding that the defendant's entrapment by estoppel failed
to meet the elements); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678, at *1 (9th Cir.
Mar. 2, 2004) (rejecting the defendant's claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on his
attorney's failure to recognize the entrapment by estoppel defense); United States v. MirandaRamirez, 309 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002) (concerning an immigration violation). The most
common crime charged is firearm violations.
156. A few of the cases involve former government informants who had temporary authority
to go along with illegal activities as part of a sting operation (or so it was claimed), but this
authorization expired while the defendant continued. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d
50, 55-56 (1 st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant's previous collaboration with the government
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exceedingly rare, of course, that an official would encourage a citizen to
commit some common-law crime of violence or theft. The entrapment by
estoppel defense would probably not apply such a case anyway, because
acting on such a suggestion would probably seem "unreasonable" to a
court.
Firearms violations dominate this field.'57 Convicted felons purchase
guns, a rather predictable violation of federal law, under a blithe or
simplistic hope that the prohibitions do not apply in their case. The
purported assurances usually come in the form of written instructions on
the permit application form,' 58 verbal instructions about the application
from gun shop owners, who in rare cases held to be agents of the state,
because of their special role in administering the federal applications. 5 9
misled him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as he turned over the
material to a government agent).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that there was
no basis for a defense of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Emerson, 2004 WL 180360, No.
03-10104, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (ruling that there was no basis for entrapment by estoppel
defense or for ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844 (6th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant could not present an entrapment by estoppel defense); United
States v. Haire, No. 02-2162, 2004 WL 406141, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2004) (affirming judgment
against the defendant that claimed he was not aware that felon-in possession laws have been
revised); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertaining to his unlawful possession of a firearm charge);
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004) (accepting the entrapment by estoppel
defense because the defendant reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent); United
States v. Scott, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819, at *2 (10th Cir. May 30, 2002) ("Defendant has
failed to establish a reasonable probability that this [entrapment] defense would have changed the
outcome of his case and thus failed to establish the prejudice required for a showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel"); United States v. Kubowski, No. 02-6343, 2003 WL 23033199, at *4 (10th
Cir. Dec. 30,2003) (denying the defendant's entrapment by estoppel defense because there was no
evidence the statements actively misled him); Swartz v. Iowa, No. COO-2065, 2003 WL 32173383,
at *1 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2002); Fehr v. Coplan, No. Civ. 03-59-M, 2003 WL 22489735, at *1
(D.N.H. Nov. 4,2003); People v. Babich, No. A098521,2003 WL 21958615, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 18,2003); People v. Sparazynski, No. 243381,2004 WL 345371, at * 1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb.
24, 2004); State v. Krzeszowski, 24 P.3d 485, 489-90 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (denying the
entrapment by estoppel defense because appellant was not affirmatively misled); State v. Leavitt,
27 P.3d 622 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant was misled when he failed to
receive notice of the statute prohibiting firearms); State v. Morley, No. 21357-9-1I1, 2004 WL
171587, at * 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 29,2004). These are all recent cases; surveys going back further
reveal a similar predominance of firearms violations as the underlying substantive offense.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819, at *2 (10th Cir. May
30,2002) ("Defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability that this defense would have
changed the outcome of his case and thus has failed to establish the prejudice required for a
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel"); United Statesv. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2004) (accepting the defendant's entrapment by estoppel defense because the defendant
reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent).
159. See, e.g., Fehr v. Coplan, No. Civ. 03-59-M, 2003 WL 22489735, at *1 (D.N.H. Nov. 4,
2003); Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the entrapment by estoppel defense was successful
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Some claims assert assurances or tacit approval from courts, police, or
probation officers who fail to admonish the defendant properly. 6 °
Eligibility requirements - like the no-felon rule for gun licenses - are

particularly suited for creating the scenarios where this defense arises.
Misstating one's eligibility or hiding disqualifying factors on federal forms
are commonplace transgressions, but can still trigger criminal sanctions. 6 '
This offense, in turn, can constitute a probation violation, and the
consequences for some defendants are quite severe. 62 If one thinks of
"entrapment by estoppel" primarily in terms of fudging on gun license
applications and the like, the limited usefulness of the defense becomes
apparent. There is only one academic article devoted to the subject from

because the defendant reasonably relied on the advice of a government agent); Scott, 2002 WL
1150819, at *2 ("Defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability that this defense would
have changed the outcome of his case and thus failed to establish the prejudice required for a
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel"); People v. Sparazynski, No. 243381, 2004 WL
345371 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Haire, No. 02-2162, 2004 WL 406141, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 2,
2004) (defendant told by state police he could own firearms; not valid defense on federal charges);
United States v. Kubowski, No. 02-6343, 2003 WL 23033199, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003)
(assurances from judge); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
unlawful ineffective assistance of counsel claim for possession of a firearm); Swartz v. Iowa, No.
COO-2065, 2003 WL 32173383, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 30, 2002); Swartz v. Mathes, 291 F. Supp.
2d 861, 872 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (stating that the record shows that the prisoner failed to present his
entrapment by estoppel claim as a constitutional issue, and did not overcome this failure by showing
cause, prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice); State v. Johnson, 83 P.3d 772 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2004) (manslaughter plea/violation ofprobation); People v. Babich, No. A098521, 2003 WL
21958615, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2003) (sheriff returned guns to defendant's possession
after confiscation); United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (reliance on
probation officer); Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 491 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (defense
successful where probation officer authorized gun possession).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the trial
court's refusal to instruct on the entrapment by estoppel defense because there was no evidenciary
basis in the record to support the defense); State v. Howell, No. 97C1824, 1998 WL 807800, at *8
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov 17, 1998); People v. Dingman, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 211,217 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); see also United States v. Whitecloud, No. 02-50206,2003 WL 1459508, at * 1 (9th Cir. Mar.
18, 2003) (welfare fraud violates probation); State v. Johnson, 83 P.3d 772 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004)
(plea agreement in homicide case violated probation in another jurisdiction); Poppell v. City of San
Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1998) (operation of nudist club).
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the last ten years,"' and only two bar journal articles," 6 indicating the
small amount of interest this doctrine generates. Eligibility requirements
arise in many non-firearms cases as well, especially with certain
immigration and illegal re-entry cases.'6 5
Like other entrapment defenses, the number of cases in this area has
been decreasing for the past few years. 166 The U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the doctrine in three cases, 167 the third being in 1973 when the
Court actually used the term "entrapment by estoppel." Previous cases

163. See Connelly, supra note 152 (arguing that the defense should only apply to crimes not
requiring proof of culpable intent, and that the applicability of the defense in a given case should
be decided by ajudge, not the jury). Two older articles provided some of the conceptual framework
for courts addressing this issue before it took on its present name. See Recent Case, State Estopped
to Prosecute Criminal Conduct Suggested by Police, 81 HARv. L. REv. 895 (1968) (discussing
Peoplev. Donovan,279 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967)); Note, Applying EstoppelPrinciples
in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969).
164. Michael S. Pasano et al., Using the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel, 26 CHAMPION
20 (2002); Mark S. Cohen, EntrapmentBy Estoppel, 31 COLO. LAw. 45 (2002). Both articles are
descriptive law summaries designed to aid practitioners, without advocating for a significant change
in policy.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. Mar. 2,
2004) ("Defendant did not demonstrate that his asserted defense of entrapment by estoppel had a
"reasonable probability" of success, so he has not demonstrated prejudice based on his previous
attorney's failure to recognize it."); United States v. Alba, No. 01-2510, 2002 WL 522819, at *1
(3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2002); United States v. Miranda-Ramirez, 309 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52, 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that jury instructions were
erroneous); United States v. Santana Cruz, 216 F.3d 1074 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. RamirezValencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the entrapment by estoppel defense
failed because defendant had no reasonable basis to rely on the advice given); United States v.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant was not
entitled to entrapment by estoppel defense because the legal conseling organization he consulted
was not a government agency); United States v. Ortegon-Uvalde, 179 F.3d 956,960(5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the defendant could not avail himself of the entrapment by estoppel defense because
he did not rely on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's erroneous warning); United States
v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1997) (Active misleading did not occur unless the
government affirmatively told a citizen that an activity was lawful. The court held that defendant
was not actively misled because the notice did not affirmatively state that it was legal to re-enter
the United States after five years without the consent of the Attorney General.); United States v.
Thomas, 70 F.3d 575, 576 (11 th Cir. 1995) (affirming the defendant's sentence because he failed
to show that reliance upon the erroneous form when he re-entered the United States).
166. From 1994-1997 the entrapment defense, in federal courts, was raised in forty-two
reported cases, from 1998-2001, it was raised forty-nine, and from 2002-2004 only twenty-nine
times.
167. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973) (remanding case to
allow the corporation to present evidence of its reliance to satisfy the defense of entrapment by
estoppel); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,572-73 (1965) (holding that the defendant's conviction
could not be sustained based on his reliance of the sheriffs dispersal order); Raley v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 423, 440-42 (1959) (finding that the convictions of three defendants were precluded because
they were instructed by a government agent that they had a right to refuse to answer questions).
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simply called it a due process violation. 168 The federal cases peaked around
1995169 and have declined since then. 7 ' This is a rapid rise and fall for a
criminal defense. It is very difficult to find any estoppel cases at all before
than
1981 in the federal district or circuit courts; 171 and there were fewer
72
five reported cases per year, nationwide, until the early 1990s.,
168. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 674.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
defense of entrapment by estoppel is excluded because the elements were not satisfied); Roberts v.
State, 48 F.3d 1287, 1292 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant would be given a sentencing
hearing with no mandated minimum sentence because his arresting officer failed to tell him all of
the consequences that could result from his refusal to take the blood/alcohol test); United States v.
French, 46 F.3d 710, 718 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming the lower court's determination of the length
of defendant's sentence and his past criminal history.); United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39,43-44
(2d Cir. 1995) (defining all elements ofentrapment by estoppel); United States v. Sims, 68 F.3d 476
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kyle, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Light, 64 F.3d
660 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Campbell, 65 F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
defendant was not entitled to entrapment by estoppel because he did not demonstrate any basis for
the defense); United States v. Caron, 64 F.3d 713, 719 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that the petition for
rehearing en banc granted but limited to certain issues); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379,
1383 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant's prior felony convictions were properly used as
predicate offenses for his conviction and sentencing); United States v. Heavilin, 60 F.3d 835 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Valentine, 59 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Neufeld, 908
F. Supp. 491,498-99 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that entrapment by estoppel barred prosecution);
United States v. Indelicato, 887 F. Supp. 23 (D. Mass. 1995).
170. A growing number of these cases, interestingly, have the procedural posture of being
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, indicating that the defense functions sometimes as an
afterthought or last resort. See, e.g., United States v. Strube, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540, at
*2 (3d Cir. May 30, 2003) (holding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel and outrageous
conduct by the government not available to the defendant); United States v. Emerson, No. 0310104, 2004 WL 180360, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (finding that the defendant had not shown
that he had a valid defense of entrapment by estoppel, so he could not have shown that his
attorney's failure to request an instruction or to object to the lack of an instruction was
professionally unreasonable or that he was prejudiced); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Lewis, No. 01-10270, 2003 WL 722128 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003)
(finding that a partially redacted article that gave some evidence that defendants were guilty, was
not unfairly prejudicial, and thus did not adversely affect the jury's attitude toward defendants apart
from their judgment of guilt as to the crimes charged); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-10070,
2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. Mar. 2,2004); United States v. Scott, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819
(10th Cir. May 30,2002); Ex ParteDwyer, No. 08-01-00059-CR, 2002 WL 28018 (Tex. App. Jan.
10,2002).
171. The cases up to 1988 were concentrated in the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Clegg, 846
F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defense of reliance on government officials
was available to defendant); United States v. Burke, 863 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the prosecution and conviction
of defendant for the receipt and possession of firearms violated due process, because he was misled
by the government agent who sold him the weapons into believing that his conduct would not be
contrary to federal law); United States v. Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. United States v. Mandel, No. 90-50414, 1991 WL 268719, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 1991);
United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1492 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that defendants were not

ENTRAPMENTBYNUMBERS

The state patterns are different. They are still increasing,'73 although
they got off to a much slower start. There are almost no reported state cases
before 1988,174 and then only one or two per year nationwide from 1992 to

entitled to an entrapment by estoppel instruction because there was no evidence that they were ever
told by a state official that their actions were legal); United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1019
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant was not permitted to offer evidence as to his mindset
for the defense of entrapment by estoppel because the defense focused on the mindset of the
government official); United States v. Fauls, Nos. 90-5554, 91-5385, 1991 WL 206293, at *1 (4th
Cir. Oct. 16, 1991); United States v. Mitran, No. 90-1316, 1991 WL 130221, at *1 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 711 (1 st Cir. 199 1) (finding that the proposed evidence did
not justify a finding of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Ham, No. 90-5367, 1991 WL
186858, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1991); United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir.
1991) (affirming that the district court properly excluded evidence of the defendant's claim that he
relied on advice by a state court judge because the government that prosecuted him was not the
government that mistakenly and misleadingly interpreted the law); United States v. McErquiaga,
No. 90-10242, 1991 WL 45291, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1991); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d
1397, 1398 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that the trial judges refusal to give the requested charge on
the theory of the defense of entrapment by estoppel was reversible error); United States v. Austin,
915 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the sales clerk at the pawn shop was not a
government official for purposes of an entrapment by estoppel defense); Mount v. Cooperman, No.
89-56193, 1990 WL 125346, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1990); United States v. Reyes Vasquez, 905
F.2d 1497, 1498 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court properly excluded evidence related
to appellant's public authority defense); United States v. Jones, Nos. 89-10127, 89-10128, 1990
WL 94971, at * 1(9th Cir. July 10, 1990); United States v. Hawkins, No. 88-1289, 1990 WL 56143,
at *1 (9th Cir. May 2, 1990); United States v. Tapuvae, No. 88-1285, 1990 WL 15093, at *1 (9th
Cir. Feb. 14, 1990); United States v. Collamore, 751 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (D. Me. 1990) (finding
that the factual predicates for defendant's assertions were lacking, so his due process claim based
on vindictive prosecution failed); United States v. Marcos, No. 555587CR598(JFK), 1990 WL
16161, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1990); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 88-1125, 1989 WL 69934,
at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 1989); United States v. Evans, 712 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (D. Mont. May 16,
1989); United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290, 291 (D. Colo. Apr. 6, 1989) (finding that the
defendant could not be convicted because his possession of a revolver was in reasonable reliance
of a state court judge's erroneous order that he could possess a firearm while hunting); Burkett v.
State, 518 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the "lack of knowledge defense" to
a violation of the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon statute, was available only to a
defendant who was not aware of his possession of a firearm, not to a defendant who asserted he did
not know he was a convicted felon); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1985).
173. Supratext accompanying note 171. The defense was raised three times from 1994-1997,
ten times from 1998-2001, and twelve times from 2002-2004, at least in the cases (published and
unpublished) available on Westlaw.
174. See Burkett v. State, 518 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). There are three or four
cases from the early 1970s that discuss the scenarios now typical for this defense under the rubric
of "entrapment OR estoppel," using traditional elements for the former and equitable estoppel
analysis for the latter, very skeptically. See, e.g., Cohen v. City of New York, 329 N.Y.S.2d 596,
598 (New York 1972); People v. Larson, 308 N.E.2d 148, 684 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding that
elements of the entrapment defense were not met); State v. LeDent, 176 N.W.2d 21,22 (Neb. 1970)
("[E] stoppel is no defense to a criminal action."); People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196, 197 (Cal.
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1998.175 Since then the defense has become more commonplace in the state
courts, and the numbers are catching up to the federal cases. This is
surprising, in a sense, given the continuing predominance of federal
regulatory crimes.
The cases prior to 1981 involved fact patterns that actually blurred the
lines between entrapment by estoppel and the traditional entrapment
defense, such as bribery cases.'7 6 An agent posing as a government official
pretending to accept a bribe is in some sense being open and explicit about
their government status. Nonetheless there is a ruse at work, as with the
traditional defense. This recurring fact scenario prevented entrapment by
estoppel from developing as a distinct legal doctrine until the 1980s. It is
somewhat unfortunate that the terminology choice did not settle on simple
estoppel or government estoppel rather than including entrapment. It would
have been less confusing, and more descriptive.
Entrapment by estoppel provides another illustration of legal
uncertainty and differing levels of access to legal information. The
interplay with these concepts differs somewhat from the previously
discussed categories of defenses. Sentencing entrapment results from high
levels ofcertainty in punishment rules; entrapment by estoppel results from
high levels of certainty in conduct rules, such as eligibility or authorization
rules.

Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (finding that the convictions were not erroneous due to the defendant's claim
of entrapment).
175. See State v. Johnson, No. CA97-07-006, 1998 WL 1701, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);
Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Dingman, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 211,212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the trial court's judgment because the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114 (Mass. 1993); State v.
Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992) (finding that the common law and constitutional entrapment
defense was unavailable to defendant because the police had not coerced defendant into driving his
vehicle, but instead had ordered defendant to leave in his vehicle, without knowledge of his
intoxication, while they were attempting to break up a fight in a parking lot). There are no reported
state cases using the phrase "entrapment by estoppel" for the years 1989-91, or 1994-95.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing and
remanding because the jury instructions misled the jury); State v. DeKay, 387 So. 2d 570 (La.
1980) (finding no evidence of entrapment); United States v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979);
Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming the lower court's conviction of
public accountant that bribed a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service); People v. Strohl, 57
Cal. App. 3d 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("[T]he evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding
that the criminal intent to commit the bribery originated in the mind of defendant, not the agent's
or coroner's, and thus, there was no unlawful entrapment."); Johnston v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 356
F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding that a claim ofentrapment did not violate the accused's civil
rights and was dismissed); United States v. Caracci, 446 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming the
bribery conviction on June 2, 1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

ENTRAPMENTBYNUMBERS

First, the offenses that give rise to entrapment by estoppel are almost
all technical violations of statutes. 77 Many of the defendants could not
have been charged with a common-law crime having basic act-intent
requirements; instead, the case turns on breaching a line drawn somewhat
arbitrarily but still legitimately by the legislature. Licensing and eligibility
regulations, such as those pertaining to firearms, sometimes serve an
important public policy function, but the parameters themselves are not as
much a matter of public morality as the need to have some sort of structure
or framework in place. This means that the offenders are unlikely to have
moral intuitions or inculcated social norms about the precise requirements
of the law. If the rules were unclear, vague, or general, defendants would
be better able to rebut the charges on the merits, arguing either that there
was a lack of criminal intent or that their behavior did not rise to the level
of the criminality contemplated by the statute. The certainty and precision
of the rules at issue in these cases create a type of strict liability. Rules on
the strict liability end of the continuum are the ones most likely to give rise
to an entrapment by estoppel defense.
Greater certainty in legal rules is more likely to give rise to strict
liability. There are a few exceptions where statutes have higher gradations
of regulatory felonies for knowing or intentional violations, which is the
case with some tax fraud regulations. It is not only a type of crime that

177. That is, violating firearm licensing requirements, etc. The main exception to this statement
is the line of cases involving former government informants who claim to have had temporary
authorization to engage in criminal activity (such as collecting child pornography or storing
narcotics as part of a previous sting operation, who continued to do so after their period of
authorization ended). See, e.g., United States v. Fulcher, 188 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D. Va. 2002)
(DEA agent acknowledged that he might have misled the defendant into believing he had authority
to investigate drug dealing between guards and inmates, therefore the defense was valid);United
States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant's previous collaboration
with the government mislead him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as
he turned over the material to a government agent); see also United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221
(9th Cir. 1988) (government knew and encouraged the defendant to sell firearms); United States
v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (arguing that his deputization by the city
reflected the federal government's approval of cultivating marijuana, but the defense failed because
immunity under the controlled substance act was only granted when enforcing a law under the act);
United States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426, 2004 WL 1147091 (2d Cir. May 21, 2004) (claiming that
she was recruited by a government informant to distribute heroin, but in order to prevail on the
defense the government, not the informant, had to give her actual authority to act as an informant);
United States v. Strube, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3d Cir. May 30, 2003) (claiming that
an informant recruited him to help in a government drug trafficking investigation, however the
defense failed because he was not directly authorized by the government); United States v. Parker,
267 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (claiming he was compiling images of child pornography for
government agents, however he did not have authorization by a government agent); United States
v. Pickard, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kan. 2003) (Defendant had a relationship with the DEA and
other governmental agencies as an informant, but the defense failed because he could not prove that
his conduct in manufacturing LSD was authorized).
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lends itself to this defense, but also a level of verbal certainty and precision
in the rule itself.
Technical violations also place the citizenry at the mercy of the
government for adequate information or notice about the rules. It is harder
to guess, for example, what might be the exceptions to the felon-firearm
rule, much less the exceptions to the exceptions. "78 Ignorance of the law,
however, is generally no excuse.' 79 This is the case even with regulatory or
technical offenses. Active misinformation or miscommunication might be
a defense; and that is the essence of entrapment by estoppel defense.

178. See, e.g., People v. Dingman, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); United States
v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Emerson, No. 03-10104,
2004 WL 180360 (5th Cir. Jan. 28,2004); United States v. Alba, Nos. 01-2510,01-2907,2002 WL
522819, at * 1 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2002); United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Haire, No. 02-2162,
2004 WL 406141, at *I (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2004); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gil, 297
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Strube, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3d Cir. May 30, 2003); United States v. MirandaRamirez, 309 F.3d 1255(10th Cir. 2002); Commonwealth v. Cosentino, No. 2122 C.D.2003, 2004
WL 1103678 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 13, 2004).
179. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 47 (1991) Holmes noted that this
"substantive principle is sometimes put in the form of a rule of evidence, that every one is presumed
to know the law"). It is exactly this form of the rule that this section brings into question. See also
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 147-58 (2d ed. 2001); Model Penal Code §
2.02(9) (1996) ("Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor knowledge as to whether conduct
constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the
elements of an offense is a defense."). Holmes' explanation includes a strong dose of "tough luck"
in typical Holmesian prose:
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's
indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public
policy sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden
of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and
murder. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could
not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would
be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men
know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger
interests on the other side of the scales.
HOLMES, supraat 48; see alsoPAULH. ROBINSON, CRIMINALLAw545-53 (1997); DRESSLER,SUpra
at 165-77 (summarizing the general rule and its traditional rationales). Dressler notes that ignorance
of the law is more likely to constitute a defense if it somehow negates a mens rea requirement for
the specific crime in question. Sometimes, of course, a mistake of law (which I believe is different
from, but overlaps with, ignorance of the law, although Dressier treats them together) can be an
excuse where the defendant in the case relied upon an official interpretation of the law, such as an
Attorney General opinion letter. See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619 (Mass.
1993); Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 484-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).

ENTRAPMENT BYNUMBERS

Heightened legal certainty in eligibility or authorization rules creates a
special, paradoxical situation: adequate communication of the rule is
necessary for compliance but not for liability. Certain individuals generally, those disqualified from the eligibility in question - could not
know the exact parameters of the rule without being told. 8 Yet actual
notice or effective communication from the government is not required for
conviction, only "constructive notice," that is, some sort of token
communication to the public. 8 ' This conundrum is true with many
criminal laws, of course - most people do not know exactly what the laws
in their jurisdiction say,'82 which is no defense to crime, while the

180. See, e.g., Doctor's Hosp. of Hyde Park v. Appeal ofDaiwa Special Asset Corp., 337 F.3d
951 (7th Cir. 2003) ("There are an enormous number of state laws, and it might be unreasonable
to expect a person... to determine in advance the possible bearing of all of them."); Torres v. INS,
144 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1998) (immigration laws changed without public announcement or
publication).
. 181. See, e.g., North Carolina v. White, 590 S.E.2d 448, 452-53 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (Jan.
20, 2004) (quoting State v. Young, 535 S.E.2d 380, 386 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)) ("Although
ignorance of the law is no excuse .... due process requires that the defendant have knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the statutory requirements before he can be charged with its violation.");
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction ofPenalStatutes, 71 VA. L.
REv. 201, 206-12 (1985); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 217-18
(2003). Regarding strict liability, LaFave says that "some attention should be given here to the
question of whether liability may be imposed for an omission when the defendant was... unaware
of the existence or scope of the legal duty." Some courts refuse to hold defendants liable for crimes
of omission without having knowledge of the statute creating the duty omitted, according to
LaFave, but courts generally assume that defendants have (constructive) knowledge of statutes
when they violate them with affirmative actions.
182. In a recent study of educated citizens in four different states, the results confirmed the
hypothesis that "people do not have a clue about what the laws of their states hold on... important
legal issues." John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the CriminalLaw, 35 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 165, 167 (2001).
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government has some technical duty of generalized notice.183 The tension
is more evident, however, with eligibility requirements.
This tension is worse, perhaps, due to the nature of eligibility
requirements. People are more likely to engage in wishful thinking or
excessive optimism that they are part of an "included group" than they are
to think that an act of violence, theft, possession of contraband, etc. is
somehow legal. This seems especially true when the "included group" is
the majority of the population, as with non-felons who want gun licenses.
Finally, the numbers of cases seem to reflect the changing levels of
uncertainty pertaining to the defense itself. The scarcity of cases until
recently is rather striking. It is hard to believe that government agents
throughout history have managed to communicate better than they have in
the last ten years. Rather, it seems that the idea of raising the defense
simply occurs to more defendants now that the elements of the defense
have been crystallized, as evidenced by the failure rate/weakness of the
defense itself in the reported cases. The federal cases, however, did not
increase in response to the crystallization of the rule in the early 1970s.
183. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994); see also, e.g., Cambell v.
Bennett, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (quoting Landgraf,511 U.S. at 264) ("[Tlhe
due-process concept of fair notice.... is central to the legitimacy of our legal system: Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law
is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.").
Probably the most well-known case about the notice requirement in criminal law, at least from the
U.S. Supreme Court, is Lambert v. California, involving a residency registration law for felons
visiting Los Angeles. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The defendant has lived in the
city for seven years but did not know about the requirement; the U.S. Supreme Court held that her
conviction under the ordinance violated due process rights. Id. at 229-30.It is not clear, however,
that the Court was concerned entirely with the notice issue, although the opinion certainly relies on
that in part; Lambert's crime also involved a simple omission or passive act (not registering), which
would not have been a crime at all under common law. See id.at 225-30. Moreover, the Court may
have simply disliked the residency registration requirement because of the general chilling effect
that such requirements have on interstate travel. See id. The ambiguity of its holding, and the other
complicating factors in the case, have caused it to have little value for precedent compared to other
Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law area. See generallyDRESSLER, supranote 179, at 15254 (discussing Lambert and possible interpretations of its holding); LAFAVE, supra note 181, at
203.
It is important to note, however, that the Lambert decision does not require
legislative tampering with the doctrine that ignorance of the criminal law is no
excuse. Ignorance of the law, after all, is an excuse when it negative [sic] a
required mental element of the crime, so it would be fairly simple to redraft
legislation of the kind condemned in Lambert so that guilt depends upon a
knowing violation of a legal duty.
Id. Another reading of the case is that it stands for the notion that unlimited uncertainty uncertainty in the rules (i.e., vagueness) severe enough to undermine the deterrent effect - is
invalid. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 7.

ENTRAPMENT BY NUMBERS

The jump in the number of cases is probably more related to changes in
federal gun-licensing laws in the late 1980s or early 1990s, or a shift in
focus of federal law enforcement to drug enforcement. The ongoing
increase of estoppel cases in state court is probably attributable to the fact
that it is a much newer defense at that level, and many states have yet to
consider their first test case or apply the defense to a significant range of
facts. 184
V. ENTRAPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
As crime has gone on-line in recent years, so has law enforcement.
Certain crimes, like identity theft, electronic money laundering, and attacks
on web sites, depend inherently on the use of computers. It is not at all
surprising that solving or preventing such crimes involves computer
surveillance and enforcement.
What is more surprising is the use of computers and the Internet for one
of the most base, impulse-driven, and unsophisticated sorts of crimes:
sexual predation on children. 85 This section is devoted primarily to this
crime, rather than on "core" computer crimes, such as hacking and denial
of service attacks on web sites. Although these crimes present interesting
issues for possible entrapment claims, the tech-entrapment cases
themselves are almost entirely focused on pederasty.
Pedophiles find the Internet particularly suited for pursuing their ends;
it allows anonymity, freedom from normal social inhibitions, and a wide
range in which to search for "consenting" youth to victimize. 8 6 Apart from

184. See, e.g., State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808, at *1 (Ark. Apr.
8, 2004) (state claimed the defense was not available because it was not a recognized defense in the
state, but it was allowed by the court.).
185. An interesting historical observation was made by a federal court in New York:
The interest of federal law enforcement officers in the flow of child pornography
over the Internet was evidently piqued by the much-publicized case involving the
abduction of a ten-year old Maryland boy ... Bureau agents investigating the
matter discovered that computer on-line services were being used to entice
children into sexual encounters with adults, and that child pornography was being
distributed regularly by computer. The Baltimore office of the FBI subsequently
spearheaded an investigation wherein law enforcement agents would sign on to
computer services and attempt to identify traffickers of image files containing
child pornography. Evidence against defendant in the case at bar originated from
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
186. See Gregg, supra note 16, at 161-66 (discussing ways in which computers and the
Internet facilitate child-related sex crimes); see also Yamagami, supra note 15, at 550.
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recruitment efforts, pedophiles who like to associate with others sharing
the same preferences and desires are able to find one another much more
easily, to communicate freely across long distances, and to share child-porn
images or stories instantly." 7 In rational-choice terms, the transaction and
search costs for pedophilia, which once were quite high outside the
extended family, have been drastically reduced. While some may contend
that on-line sex-related activities simply reflect the real-world of sexual
enterprise, pedophilia is a special case that has almost always carried
severe social stigma, limited opportunities, and complications with finding
cooperative victims. The on-line environment is particularly conducive to
the commission of this type of crime.
The Internet is also particularly conducive to certain types of sting
operations. To the extent that the Web has altered the landscape for
pedophilia, it has also altered law enforcement.' It is easy, both in the
sense of being simple and cheap, for officers or agents to troll on-line
chatrooms posing as adolescents seeking sexual experimentation to lure
pedophiles into extended correspondence while accumulating
incriminating evidence from conversations and e-mailed images.
Eventually they arrange a real-life sexual rendezvous, which usually
becomes the occasion and location of the arrest.8 9

187. See Gregg, supra note 16, at 161-66.
188. See Hanson, supra note 16, at 536 ("The ease with which law enforcement officials can
assume false identities in cyberspace and the suitability of cyberspace for consensual or victimless
crimes indicate a probable increase in undercover sting operations.").
189. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Mitchell left his
home in Elkhart, Indiana on December 15,2001, and drove to the pre-arranged meeting spot in the
parking lot of a Holiday Inn in Hillside. Once there, he called Dena to let her know that he had
arrived.... Shortly thereafter, a Sheriff's Deputy posing as Dena approached Mitchell and he was
arrested."); United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (meeting at hotel in
another state, surprised by agents); Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(defendant arrested while waiting at ice cream stand for supposed victim, with a box of condoms,
a key to a hotel room prepared with bottle of wine, etc.); State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13 (Neb.
2003) (finding that the defendant was induced to commit the offense because the undercover agent
repeatedly tried to encourage defendant to have sexual relations with her young daughter); State v.
Ryerson, 2004 WL 1433672, 2004-Ohio-3353, (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2004) ("Appellant arrived
at the restaurant at the designated time, stayed there a short while, and then traveled to a nearby gas
station. .. [The police] who had been watching appellant from his squad car, followed him into the
gas station. There, he arrested appellant and transported him to the police department."); State v.
Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("arrested by... police while attempting to
meet 'Molly,' the other supposed fourteen-year-old virgin. Molly was actually a policeman...");
State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2004) (involving a minister that arranged
through the Internet to commit unlawful sexual acts with a minor); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d
1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (arrested at gas station rendezvous).
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The rules regulating sting operations, of which the entrapment defense
is a major part,19 have not adapted fully to this new environment.' 9 ' These
cases proceed under traditional rules for entrapment in the given
jurisdiction, generally resulting in an unsuccessful defense. Those more
concerned about overly aggressive law enforcement could see this as a bad
trend; 92 those more concerned about the seriousness of this particular
crime tend to see the trend of a broken-down entrapment defense as a
miniscule move in the right direction.' 93
Traditional rules for entrapment are becoming inapplicable. There are
five major problems with applying the traditional rules, which have made
the entrapment defense unworkable in these cases to the point of becoming
nearly obsolete. First, "predisposition," usually the critical element under
the subjective test, is a foregone conclusion in almost all of the cases
because the defendants actively log onto certain chat rooms and engage in
repeated, typed communications with their intended victims.'94 Second, in
states using the objective test, the conduct and conversations of the agents
can be very difficult to trace or verify. There is less accountability for
government where the enforcement method is cheap and relatively
invisible when orchestrated.'95 Traditional stings typically require a host of
armed "backup" agents nearby in case the primary undercover operative
encounters trouble. Catching pedophiles can be done mostly from a cubicle
in an office.' 9 6 In addition, the Internet enables a single officer to entrap
multiple individuals at once, as through on-line bulletin board postings.

190. Apart from internal procedural guidelines for undercover operations, of course.
191. See generally Hanson, supra note 16, at 536 ("[T]he current entrapment doctrines as
applied to cyberspace do not effectively address the concerns behind the entrapment defense...
[r]equiring law enforcement to meet a reasonable-suspicion standard before engaging in undercover
operations would better address those concerns.").
192. See generally id.; Graham, supra note 15, at 480-83.
193. See, e.g., Gregg, supranote 16, at 188-93.
194. See Hanson, supranote 16, at 541-43 (arguing that the subjective test is inadequate for
protecting the innocent in cyberspace).
195. See id. at 544-47 (arguing that the objective test is also inadequate to protect innocent
individuals from police setups on-line). Hanson's argument on this point is different than the one
offered here; he argues that the rules for the objective test are too unclear and unsettled to apply to
this new context. I would contend, on the contrary, that the objective test makes it easy for courts
to generate bright-line rules, but that the inexpensive on-line setting makes it easy for police to
work around these clear rules.
196. There is an underlying assumption in my reasoning that costs contribute to the sense of
"reasonableness" for a court evaluating law enforcement methods; questionable methods that
involve exorbitant costs are more likely to evoke the ire of the judiciary, I assume, than
questionable methods whose cost-benefit justification is readily apparent. Even for those who
disassociate rights from efficiency concerns, costs in the real world can function as a proxy for
"reasonableness" on the part of the government, because grossly disproportionate devotion of
resources to an individual target is likely to evince something unfair and undemocratic.
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This feature of on-line entrapment may not be undesirable from a policy
perspective, but it is a significant change from the traditional arrangement
that the entrapment defense contemplated. Third, the inexpensive,
relatively invisible nature of such operations also permits private
entrapment to become rampant, which is not the case in off-line settings
or with other crimes. On-line vigilantism against pedophiles, in fact, has
taken on unexpected proportions. Traditional entrapment rules do not
allow consideration of "private entrapment." Individuals tempted, induced
or set up by anyone besides a state agent cannot raise an entrapment
defense to criminal charges.'97 Historically this was not a problem because
most individuals, even if they had the motivation to entrap others, did not
have the resources to orchestrate a sting while protecting themselves from
retaliation if caught. Private entrapment was therefore a rare occurrence.
The Internet has changed this, for better or worse, at least for the crimes
perpetrated partly on-line. Fourth, traditional entrapment rules have tended
to relax certain evidentiary rules, particularly about the admission of "past
crimes. ' On-line stings present special, new evidentiary problems
because the on-line conversations, although recorded on a computer's
storage system, are out of context when later submitted as evidence in

197. This is true except in cases of "derivative entrapment," where the private party who
entrapped the defendant was in turn entrapped by an agent. United States v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37,
38 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 5.2(a), at 452-54; John E. Nilsson, Of Outlaws and Offloads: A Casefor
DerivativeEntrapment,37 B.C. L. REv. 743 (1996). "Vicarious entrapment" refers to the situation
where the original targets of the sting operation act on their own to recruit additional members of
the conspiracy; the Valencia court held that if the original party had a valid entrapment defense, the
spouse who was subsequently recruited could also use the defense. "Derivative entrapment" refers
to situations where the undercover agent uses an unsuspecting middleman as a means of passing
on an inducement to a distant target. In rare circumstances, an entrapment defense has succeeded
for the distant target. United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 993-97 (D.C. Cir. 1997). So far,
the cases are still quite rare and usually unsuccessful. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e have expressly refused to recognize derivative entrapment as a basis for an
entrapment defense."); United States v. Turner, No. CRA 99-10098-RGS, 2003 WL 22056405, at
*I (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2003) (derivative entrapment defense held unavailable where intermediary
was not found to have been entrapped); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573-74 (4th Cir.
2000) ("[I]n the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot claim an entrapment defense based upon the
purported inducement of a third party who is not a government agent if the third party is not aware
that he is dealing with a government agent.").
198. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,458 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting); LAFAVE,
supra note 27, § 5.2(d), at 458-59. For example, North Carolina has codified this evidentiary
exception in its Rules of Evidence. North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) (2001) makes
evidence of"other crimes, wrongs, or acts" inadmissible "to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith," but admissible for other purposes "such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident." See, e.g., Di Frega v. Pugliese, 596 S.E.2d 456,460 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Bush, 595 S.E.2d 715, 719 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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court. This is essentially a hearsay problem. Unlike physical evidence,
these records are easily altered, redacted, and otherwise manipulated after
the arrest, without detection or evidence of the alteration.' 99 In addition,
agents can structure their on-line conversations linguistically to elicit
particularly incriminating statements that the defendant may not have made
otherwise."' Finally, many of these cases frame the charges as "attempt"
crimes, 20 1 with exclusion of a few cases where the charges include
the
completed crime of sending sexually explicit images to a minor. 2 2Attempt

199. See, e.g., United States v. PoehIman, 217 F.3d 692, 695 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The
government was unable to produce the text of the original e-mail at trial, but Poehlman offered
undisputed testimony as to its substance."); State v. Bolden, No. 19943, 2004 WL 1043317, at *7*9 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (State's alleged failure to preserve missing logs of Internet conversations
did not constitute Brady violation).
200. See, e.g., PoehIman, 217 F.3d at 696, n.2:
Much of the evidence in this case is in the form of e-mail messages sent back and
forth between Sharon and Poehlman. In the breezy, informal style of e-mail, there
are numerous grammatical, spelling and syntax errors in the messages. Because
indicating each mistake with a [sicI would be too distracting, and correcting all of
the errors poses the risk of altering the meaning of the messages, we reproduce the
messages in their original form, warts and all.
201. Solicitation, closely related to attempt and conspiracy, also appears in these cases,
although more often with a "real" child victim. See, e.g., United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557
(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1224 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (attempt to entice
minor to engage in sexual activity); Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 697 (referring to his initial state-court
charges of attempt); United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999) (involving Internet child
exploitation); Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (refusing to hold
that public policy required the elimination of undercover sting operations); Laughner v. State, 769
N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that impossibility to commit the crime because the child
was actually an undercover agent was not a valid defense); Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr.
2d 453 (Cal. App. 2000). Conspiracy charges can be used in jurisdictions allowing a "unilateral"
approach to conspiracy (where the only "conspirators" besides the defendant are government
agents). State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2002) (where the entrapment defense happened
to be successful).
202. See, e.g., People v. Martin, No. 231621, 2001 WL 1699653, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2001). At least one court considers attempted sex crimes with children to be a completed crime
of sexual abuse of a minor, even though the "minor" was a middle-aged undercover agent in an
Internet chat room. See People v. Chow, No. 229036, 2002 WL 857763, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.,
May 3, 2002). There are several other examples where the statute at issue allows the prosecution
to charge the defendant with a completed crime. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552
(7th Cir. 2003) (defendant charged with federal crime of traveling across state lines for sex with a
minor, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)); United States v. O'Brien, 2001 WL 1609763 (9th Cir.
2001) (same); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (soliciting underage
female on-line and going to prearranged meeting place constituted crime of "importuning" under
Ohio law). Some cases, of course, include charges for both types of offenses. See, e.g., State v.
Ryerson, No. CA 2003-06-153, 2004 WL 1433672, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2004) (attempt
and "importuning"); Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724, 725 (Ark. 2003) (attempted rape and
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charges have a strange interplay with certain defenses. Most jurisdictions
use a test requiring only that the defendant take some "substantial step"
toward the commission of an offense in order to be convicted of attempt.
This step itself does not necessarily have to be an illegal action.2 0 3 Not
having to wait for a completed crime or transaction allows law
enforcement to use simplified stings, and prosecutors to muster less
evidence than with some substantial offenses that require proof of harm or
injury. The abbreviated fact pattern of an attempt charge gives the defense
less with which to work in concocting an entrapment defense.
Under the subjective test, it may be easier to prove that a defendant was
"predisposed" to attempt a crime than to complete it since it often takes
more resolve and planning to guarantee one's criminal goal than to simply
take a substantial step in that direction.2 4 Under an objective test, it may
take somewhat less government inducement to prompt an attempt, as
opposed to a completed crime, for the same reasons; thus thee is less
likelihood of objectionable activity by the agents. In addition, the best
defense to attempt charges traditionally was "factual impossibility.
Situations where the crime went uncompleted are often ones where
completion became impossible for some reason. Yet an "impossibility"
theory for the defendant may be mutually exclusive with an entrapment
defense. This is particularly true where the latter requires an ex ante
admission of committing the crime charged. Thus, it can greatly
complicated or weaken a defense to argue alternatively both impossibility
and entrapment.
There may be good reason to leave the entrapment defense behind in
on-line pedophile cases. As discussed above, the Internet drastically
reduces the search and transaction costs for sexual predation on minors,
creating an artificially conducive environment for the crime. On-line sting
operations offset this effect, not only by catching perpetrators, but also by
creating a chilling effect in the chat rooms generally. The uncertainty
introduced by the presence of an unknown number of undercover agents
on-line can function as a deterrent that is not only healthy, but perhaps
necessary in order to re-establish a balance. If the entrapment defense is
both infeasible and undesirable in one particular area such as this, then
"pandering" obscenity via e-mail); People v. Superior Court, No. #024495, 2003 WL 21246774,
at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (included both charges of attempt and charges of the completed crime
of distributing harmful material to a minor over the Internet, a violation of California Criminal
Statutes § 288).
203. See generallyAudrey Rogers, New Technology, OldDefenses:Internet Sting Operations
andAttemptLiability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 502-07 (2004) (discussing the problems of applying
attempt liability to Internet child-sex crimes, and suggesting a more robust mens rea requirement
as a possible solution).
204. This would be a general problem with mixing entrapment under a subjective test with
attempt charges for any crime, not just on-line sexual predation.

20051
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concerns of judicial economy may justify abandoning it in this narrow
class of cases.
If there is a need to preserve the entrapment defense for innocent
citizens who somehow become beguiled by sexual conversations with an
apparent child on-line, two options exist. First, an exclusionary rule for online entrapment-related evidence would bolster the accuracy of the results
in these cases, 0 5 even if exclusionary rules have doubtful effect on the
police themselves.2"6 Adoption of this rule across the board is not
suggested - only for on-line sting operations, where the recorded text of
conversations is particularly susceptible to tampering. The technology is
widely available to automatically record on-line conversations from a
given computer. A simple rule requiring certification that such recording
was running all the time would suffice.20 7
The second proposal is to build entrapment safeguards into the
elements of attempt, rather than having entrapment function as an
affirmative defense. Audrey Rogers, for example, has suggested
incorporating a clearer definition of the requisite intent for criminal

205. Australia handles entrapment as an exclusionary rule rather than an affirmative defense.
See, e.g., Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal
Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 72-79 (2004); Ridgeway
v. Regina, 184 C.L.R. 19 (1995).
206. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 34 (using behavioral and motivational theory to
demonstrate why the rule is structurally unable to deter individual police officers from performing
most unconstitutional searches and seizures, as well as showing that the rules present troubling
dilemmas for judges due to defendants with "dirty hands"); Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A Crying
Need to Restore PoliceAccountability, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767 (2001) ("Rather, the 'penalty' for
police officer misconduct is suppression of evidence, which often renders a case unprosecutable,
thus benefiting the criminal defendant while simultaneously failing to penalize the law-breaking
police officer.").
207. Several commentators have argued for a modified entrapment defense for on-line crimes
that requires a showing of individualized "reasonable suspicion" on the part of law enforcement to
justify the sting operation - a concept borrowed from constitutionally-based exclusionary rules.
See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 16, at 547-51; Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead Us Not Into
(Unwarranted)Temptation: A Proposalto Replace the EntrapmentDefense with a ReasonableSuspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1216 (1985); Jack B. Harrison, Note, The
Government as Pornographer:Government Sting Operationsand Entrapment: United States v.
Jacobson 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067,
1088-94 (1993); Zabriskie, supra note 72, at 244; Teri L. Chambers, Note, United States v.
Jacobson: A Callfor Reasonable Suspicion of CriminalActivity as a Threshold Limitation on
Governmental Sting Operations,44 ARK. L. REV. 493, 510 (1991). Entrapment is a common-law
defense; the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized it as a constitutional issue, like the
exclusionary rules. Catching on-line pedophiles seems to be the worst possible scenario for
implementing such a requirement (although government pandering of child pornography, as in
Jacobson, is a different matter), where waiting for reasonable suspicion will often mean waiting for
a child victim to be discovered.
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liability on-line, to account for varying levels of user error or confusion.2" 8
Another approach would involve nothing more than specifying what
qualifies as a "substantial step" for attempt, that is, something off-line and
objective.2" Almost all the cases involve stings that culminated in an
arranged meeting at a motel or restaurant. Requiring some sort of
incriminating statement at the supposed rendezvous confirming the
defendant's continuing intention would not be particularly burdensome on
the police and it would make the results of the cases more predictable and
certain. Of course, such a move would make the entrapment defense
unnecessary in these cases. Given the state of the defense, it is justifiable
to develop a policy that wastes fewer judicial resources on doomed,
declining defenses.
VI. CONCLUSION

Studying the entrapment defense in terms of the numbers and varieties
of reported cases provides a fascinating glimpse into the trends in our
criminal law system. The classic defenses studied in law school are not
simply sets of rules and exceptions. Some go through long periods of
disuse, then become popular issues of litigation, and then fade again
toward disuse. It is also interesting to see that the "entrapment defense" is
actually a number of conceptually distinct defenses or claims that are often
clustered together.
The numbers of cases in which these defenses fail is also very telling.
Studying a defense as a set of elements or rules often involves looking at
208. Rogers, supra note 203, at 510-23; see Yamagami, supranote 15, at 570-78 (arguing that
the intent rules are already too lax).
209. Attempt liability draws an imaginary line, so to speak, between "mere preparation" and
a "substantial step" toward consummation of the offense; the latter triggers criminal liability, which
is not present up to that point. The exact placement of this line, however, is somewhat uncertain in
most jurisdictions, with courts defining "substantial step" mostly on a case-by-case basis. If we
conceive the defendant as moving along a continuum from "mere preparation" to completion of the
crime, whether the continuum consists of a series of steps or the passage of time, then sting
operations present the troubling scenario of helping the criminal skip some of the steps or time that
the crime would usually require, arriving at the line of a "substantial step" more quickly or easily.
If the usual progression, however, is also a progression of accumulated culpability, then the
defendant whose crime was facilitated in some way by undercover agents has arrived at the
threshold of criminal liability without passing through the usual process of accumulating culpability
or blameworthiness. One way to account for this accelerated blameworthiness may be to have a
clearer, more objective line for "substantial steps." With computer-related crime, one obvious way
to do this would be to have the step from on-line activity to real-world actions constitute a brightline rule for liability. This would be less useful where the charges involve completed crimes of
sending obscene material to minors, but more useful in situations where the defendant goes to a
prearranged location to meet his supposed victim, and later denies having an intention to
consummate the crime with a minor.
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some exemplary cases or hypothetical situations where the requirements
are met. This, in turn, can create the impression that the defense simply
works when certain elements happen together. Recognizing that the
defenses fail the vast majority of the time enriches our understanding by
adding a functional dimension. The defenses are often a last resort for
defendants in rather desperate situations. The procedural posture of a
number of cases supports this conclusion. Studying entrapment by the
numbers reveals a defense on the decline.
Mathematical, precise rules for matters such as sentencing or gradation
of felonies influence this area in a very concrete way - particularly with
sentencing entrapment, but also in other entrapment defenses. Issues of
legal certainty and uncertainty affect all these cases in two ways. First, as
legal rules become more detailed and enumerated, there arises a significant
disparity in the legal information readily available to state agents as
opposed to potential defendants. This informational disparity operates in
the background of each of the scenarios that give rise to the entrapment
defenses. Some legal rules become so precise and mechanical, numerical
benchmarks take on increased importance, whether in specified amounts
of contraband for certain sentencing factors or numbers of previous
convictions. As seen in the foregoing discussion, there is a sense in which
many defendants are entrapped by the numbers. Second, as courts rule on
a larger number of cases asserting an entrapment defense, an individual
defendant is better able to assess the chances of succeeding on the defense
in quantifiable terms, which makes pleas more likely. The greater certainty
in these numbers helps explain the decline of the defense, both in
frequency and procedural strength.
New technology has changed the playing field for certain crimes, like
sexual predation on children, and at the same time has transformed the
nature of law enforcement efforts against these very crimes. The traditional
rules of entrapment do not adapt well to this new environment, and change
is needed. While it may be possible to revamp the existing defenses to
address these developments, it may be more efficient to build entrapment
principles into the elements of the crimes themselves, achieving the same
goals with better judicial economy.
The approach taken in this Article, although novel, could be used for
fruitful research in other areas of criminal law as well. It would enrich our
understanding of all the classic criminal defenses to analyze their
functional role in our justice system and their numerical relevance for
defendants today. In addition, the effects of legal uncertainty on each
defense could be an important consideration for future policy discussion.
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